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SUMMARY 
A duality concept for discrete programming due to Balas is intro­
duced for the case of two "dual" problems with a Lagrangian-type objective 
function, where the min-max/max-min of a linear function is to be found 
over a domain defined by linear inequalities. The variables are con­
strained to belong to arbitrary sets of real numbers, i.e. some or all 
of the variables may be discrete. After a discussion of the consequences 
of including indivisibilities in linear economic models for the applica­
tion of shadow-price systems and decentralized decision making procedures, 
economic interpretations are presented for the case of a mixed-integer 
programming problem, whose dual has been formulated following Balas's 
duality concepts. A generalized shadow-price system, involving nonnega-
tive dual variables and unrestricted subsidies and penalties, is 
introduced. 
Balas's duality concept and its economic implications then are 
applied to four specific capital budgeting models. The first three 
models are based on formulations by Weingartner and Baumol and Quandt; 
they include, however, the additional assumption of indivisible projects 
and lead to new results in the interpretation of their optimal solutions. 
A finite decentralized decision making procedure is one of these results. 
By combining and extending the mentioned capital budgeting models, a 
formulation is obtained, the solution of which yields the optimal invest­
ment, dividend, and financing policy of a firm interacting with an 




Among the most important decisions which must be made in any 
company are those concerning capital investment. These decisions, which 
are made by top management, involve large sums of money and therefore 
usually require extensive planning, budgeting, and funding activities. 
In general, both external factors, over which the management of the 
company has minimal control, such as competition and economic environ­
ment, and internal factors, as budgeting practices, long- and short-term 
objectives, must be considered. 
In order to make correct capital expenditure decisions, corporate 
management needs at least three sets of information. Estimates must be 
made of net capital outlays required and future cash earnings promised 
by each proposed project. This is a problem of engineering valuation 
and market forecasting. Estimates must be made of the availability and 
cost of capital to the company. This is a problem of financial analysis. 
Finally, management needs a correct set of standards by which to select 
projects for execution so that long-run economic benefits to present 
owners will be maximized. This is basically a problem in logic and 
applied mathematics. In this research, we shall be concerned with the 
last two of the mentioned problems. 
Investment criteria have been dealt with extensively in the 
business and economic literature. Based on the well-known conventional 
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concepts of present worth, internal rate of return, risk preference, and 
utility functions, operations research methodology has been applied to 
construct and solve mathematical models for the capital budgeting 
problem. 
Since Weingartner1s important contribution for the correct theo­
retical formulation and treatment of constrained capital budgeting 
problems in 1963 (15) linear and integer programming techniques have been 
used to develop systematic approaches to these problems; and, in the case 
of linear programming models, the concept of duality has provided inter­
esting relationships for clarifying and interpreting many aspects of 
capital budgeting which have not been effectively treated by the conven­
tional methods of economic theory. 
These successful interpretations, however, have been based on the 
assumption of continuity, i.e. that all quantities (variables and con­
stants) in the model considered can be measured by real numbers. In the 
more realistic cases, where indivisibilities occur, all-integer and 
mixed-integer programming techniques must be used which have considerable 
drawbacks, both in terms of computations required and, in particular, in 
the interpretation of the solutions. Several attempts to construct a 
system of "dual shadow prices" as in linear programming models have been 
made without yielding completely satisfactory results. 
In this research, a generalized shadow-price system based on a 
duality construction by Balas (2) is introduced that avoids the usual 
problems encountered for pricing schemes in all-integer and mixed-integer 
programming. This approach is based on a theorem that allows the formu­
lation of "equivalent linear programs" to mixed-integer or pure-integer 
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programs. The result of such a construction is a system of non-negative 
dual shadow-prices and unconstrained quantities which are shown to have 
the meaning of subsidies and penalties for the profit characteristics of 
the various activities considered. 
The first part of this thesis deals with a discussion and analysis 
of Balas's duality for the linear case. Balas has studied a pair of 
dual problems in which the min-max/max/min of a linear function is to be 
found over a domain defined by linear inequalities, and some of the 
variables are constrained to belong to arnitrary sets of real numbers. 
Mixed-integer and hence all-integer (linear) programs are shown to be 
special cases of these problems. A number of properties for this pair 
of dual problems can be stated which contain, among others, symmetry, 
existence, complementary slackness, and uniqueness relations. 
This section is followed by a discussion of the problems arising 
in economic analysis when indivisibilities are included, and the intro­
duction to the concepts of shadow-prices, marginal and opportunity costs, 
competitive markets, and others. These concepts are first presented in 
a linear programming framework, whereby, as an example, the model of a 
production firm in a purely competitive market is chosen. The relevant 
aspects of centralization and de-centralization are discussed, and then 
a generalized shadow-price system for discrete programming problems is 
introduced. 
The second part of this research is devoted to the application of 
Balas's duality construction and its economic implications to four 
specific capital budgeting models. The first three models are based on 
formulations by Weingartner and Baumol and Quandt; they include, however, 
the additional assumption of indivisible projects and lead to new 
results in their economic interpretation. In each case, the aspects 
of decentralization are considered, and for the "Terminal Wealth 
Model", a procedure for decentralized decision making, based on 
Benders' Partitioning Algorithm, is developed. Finally, combining 
these models and extending them, a formulation is found which includes 
both dividend payments and terminal wealth of the firm in its objective 
function, and whose constraints contain upper limits on borrowing. 
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CHAPTER II 
BALAS'S DUALITY CONCEPT IN DISCRETE PROGRAMMING 
AND ECONOMIC INTERPRETATIONS 
2.1 Introduction 
In mathematical programming, duality theory has been of consid­
erable importance and a number of dual problems for linear and nonlinear 
primal problems have been formulated, under various assumptions on the 
structure of the primal. In linear programming, duality principles are 
readily established using the theory of linear inequalities (11) . The 
main result of linear programming duality theory is that the primal 
problem has an optimal solution if and only if the dual has one, in which 
case the values of both objective functions are equal at optimality. 
In nonlinear programming it turns out that, in order to establish 
a symmetrical duality, rather strong conditions have to be imposed on 
the problem functions, while, under less stringent conditions, a "one­
way duality" can be established: starting with one problem, under certain 
conditions, a solution to this problem provides a solution of the other 
problem. Customarily, one speaks of a dual relationship between such a 
pair of problems, even if the fully symmetrical duality properties do 
not hold. 
Balas (2) has studied a pair of dual problems, in which the 
min-max (max-min) of a linear function is to be found over a domain 
defined by linear inequalities, and the variables are constrained to 
belong to arbitrary sets of real numbers, e.g. some of all of the 
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variables may be discrete. Mixed-integer, and hence all-integer (linear) 
programs are special cases of these problems. Balas's duality construc­
tion is symmetric, i.e. the dual of the dual is the primal. Subject to 
a qualification, the primal has an optimal solution if and only if the 
dual has one, and in this case, equality between the values of the respec­
tive objective functions occurs. 
Additional properties of the pair of dual problems considered by 
Balas include conditions for the existence of feasible and finite optimal 
solutions, uniqueness of the optimum, and the relationship between the 
dual of a mixed-integer program and the dual of the linear program which 
is defined over the convex hull of feasible points to the mixed-integer 
program. 
Balas has extended the above results to the case of a quadratic 
objective function with negative, semi-definite quadratic forms (3), 
as well as to the case of a non-linear objective function and nonlinear 
constraints (4). Again, some of the variables are constrained to belong 
to arbitrary sets of real numbers. 
The basic properties established for nonlinear programs with 
exclusively continuous variables can be shown to carry over, with some 
qualification, to their generalized partly discrete counterparts that 
contain, among others, mixed-integer nonlinear programs. 
The first part of this chapter will be devoted to a discussion 
and analysis of Balas's duality concept. We will restrict ourselves to 
the linear case, which is of great relevance for the construction of the 
capital budgeting models in later chapters, and will state several 
theorems that describe the nature of this duality. The second part of 
the chapter, then, will contain several economic interpretations of 
results from mathematical programming theory in general, and Balas's 
duality in particular. 
2.2 Formulation of Primal and Dual 
Problems in the Linear Case 
Consider the pair of dual linear programs, 
max cx min ub 
(LP) subject to (LD) subject to 
Ax • y = b uA - v = c 
x,y = 0 u,v = 0, 
where A is a m x n matrix, c, x, and v are n-component vectors, and b, 
and u are m-component vectors. Two index sets are defined by 
M = (1, m), and N = (1, ..., n). 
The main result of linear programming duality theory is that 
the primal problem has an optimal solution if and only if the dual has 
one, in which case, denoting the two optimal solutions by (x,y) and 
(u,v) respectively, we have cx = ub, and uy = vx * 0. These relations 
play a central role in linear programming. 
Suppose now, the first n^ components of x and the first m^ com­
ponents of u (0 = n^ = n, 0 = m^ = m) are arbitrarily constrained, and 
the following notation is introduced: 
(x 1 } x n ) = x 1, (ux, u m ) = u 1, x = ( x ^ x 2 ) , 
1 2 u = (u ,u ), (1, n.) = Nn , (1, m ) = M . 
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Let us further partition A, b, c, y, and v in accordance with the 
partioning of x and u: 
1 2 1 2 b = (b ,b ), c = (c ,c ) 
, 1 2 N / 1 2 N 
y : (y ,y ), v : (v ,v ) 
N 
Then Balas (2) considers the following general optimization 
problem: 
1 1 1.11 1 min max c x + u y + u A x 
1 
U X 
(P) subject to 
Ax + y = b 
1 -1 1 „1 x e X , u e U 
2 2 x^,y = 0 
y"̂  unconstrained. 
x^" and U"'" are arbitrary sets of vectors in the n^"-dimensional and 
m*"-dimensional Euclidean space, i.e. some of the components of the 
vectors x and u are arbitrarily constrained. The fact that all slack 
variables belonging to y*'" are unconstrained indicates a "partial 
relaxation" of the contraint equations in (P). 
Balas defines the following problem to be the dual to (P): 
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1 1 1 A11 1 max min u b - v x + u A x 
1 
X u 
(D) subject to 
uA - v = c 
1 „1 1 v l u e U , x e X 
2 2 > n u ,v = 0 
unconstrained. 
Since, in the above pair of problems, y is uniquely defined by x, 
and v is uniquely defined by u, a solution to (p) will be written as 
(XjU'''), and a solution to (D) as (UjX'''). 
Rewriting (D) in the primal form (i.e. in the form of (p)), we 
obtain (by changing the signs in the objective function and in the 
equation set) 
m m max u(-b) + v x + u ( - A ) x 
1 
X u 
u( -A) + v = (-c) 
j^e u \ x^e x \ v* unconstrained 
2 2 u , v = 0 . 
The formulation of the dual to this problem yields (p). Thus, 
the duality defined in this way is involutary (symmetric). Balas 
states this property in a theorem. 
Theorem 1 (Involution): The dual of the dual is the primal. 
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The main feature of the above pair of dual problems is the 
special relationship between each primal variable x^ and the associated 
dual slack v., and between each dual variable u. and the associated 
primal slack y^, namely 
x. arbitrarily constrained * »v. unconstrained 
J J 
(2.1) 
x. z 0 « » v. = 0 
3 3 
y. unconstrained « » u. arbitrarily constrained 
; i l J 
y. = 0 «—• u. = 0. 
; i I 
If we now consider the case where the arbitrary constraints of 
the form x̂ "e x \ u^e Û " are integrality constraints on the components 
of x̂ " and u \ then our pair of dual problems subsumes the following 
special cases: 
(a) If = 0, then P becomes a mixed-integer linear program I. 
Its dual D is then a constrained mixed-integer optimization problem 
(max-min) of a special type (nonnegativity being the sole constraint on 
the integer variables). 
(b) If = 0 and N - N-̂  = 0, then P is a pure integer pro­
gramming problem. The dual of such a problem turns out to be a mixed-
integer optimization problem (max-min) over the nonnegative orthant, 
otherwise unconstrained. 
(c) If = 0 and : fl, P and D become a pair of dual linear 
programs. 
(d) If M - = 0 and N - z 0, then both P and D are pure 
integer optimization problems (min-max and max-min respectively) over 
the nonnegative orthant, otherwise unconstrained. 
Of course, = 0 gives rise to the converse of (a), = 0 and 
M - = 0 to the coverse of (b). Several of the special cases listed 
above will be considered in greater detail in the subsequent chapters. 
We now denote all x verifying the constraints of P with X, and 
all u verifying the constraints of D with U so that the Cartesian 
1 1 1 Product X x U is the set of feasible solutions (x,u ) to P, and U x X 
is the set of feasible solutions (UjX^) to D. 
We further let 
I 1 1 A11 1 z = min max cx + u y + u A x , 
u eU xeX 
and 
I I 111 1 w = max min u b - v x •* u A x . 
x eX ueU 
Before stating the next theorem, we need the following two 
definitions. Let s \ s P be elements of arbitrary vector spaces. 
1 2 
A vector function G(s ,s ,...,sP) will be called separable with 
respect to s''' if there exist vector functions H(s''') (independent of 
2 p 2 1 s ,...,s ), and K(s , ...,sP) (independent of s ), such that 
G(s\s 2, ...,sP) = H(s 1) - K(s 2,...,s P). 
1 2 
G(s ,s ,. . .,sP) will be called componentwise separable with 
1 1 respect to s , if each component g^ of G can be written either as g^(s 
or as gi(s , .. .,sr) . 
the following theorem. 
Using this concept of separability, Balas has stated and proved 
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2 2 
Theorem 2 (Saddle-Point). Assume that v (or y ) is componentwise 
separable with respect to u''" (to x''") . Then, if P has an optimal 
- -1 -2 - -1 - -1 -2 solution (x,u ), there exists u such that (u,x ), where u = (u ,u ) 
is an optimal solution to D, with 
1 1 1.11 1 min max cx-t-uy + u A x 
u eU xeX 
and the function 
1 1 1.11 1 = max min u b + v x - u A x , 
x̂ eX"*" ueU 
F(x,u) - cx + ub - uAx + u A x 
has a saddle-point at (x,u): 
F(x,u) - F(x,u) - F(x,u) 
-2 -2 
for all xeX(y ), ueU(v ) . These sets are defined by 
v / - 2 . f | 21 1 .22 2 ,2 -2 X(y ) = 1 xeX | A x + A x = b - y , 
T T / - 2 N / T T I 1.12 2 22 2 -2 U(v ) = 1 xeU | u A + u A = c + v 
Let us now denote 
X + = { xeX I A 1 2 x 2 § b 1 } , 
U* = {ueU | u 2 A 2 1 S o 1 } . 
Then Balas's next theorem reads: 
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Theorem 3 (Existence). If v (or y ) is componentwise separable with 
respect to ii"*" (to x"*") , then exactly one of the following five situations 
holds for P and D: 
(1) z = +• °°, w = + o o and U + = 0 
(2) z = - °°, w = - c o and X + = 0 
(3) z and w are undefined; X* = 0, U = 0 
(4) z = - o o , w » • o o , x = 0, U = 0 
(5) z and w are finite, and z = w. 
Balas extends the complementary slackness concept of linear 
programming to the more general case of the dual problems P and D. 
- -1 - -1 
Theorem 4 (Complementary Slackness). If (x,u ) and (u,x ) are optimal 
solutions to P and D respectively, then 
-2-2 n "2-2 n u y z 0 , v x = 0 , 
and 
, 2 -1.12.-2 -2,, 2 A21-l. _ (c - u A )x - u(b - A x ) z 0 
Balas furthermore establishes a uniqueness relationship between 
the optimal solutions to P and D. 
Definition. (x,u^) X x U ^ " is called an extreme solution to P, if x is 
an extreme point of the convex hull of X. 
It is obvious that if P has an optimal solution, then it has 
an optimal extreme solution. 
Definition. Let (x,u^) be an extreme solution to P; let p and q be the 
2 2 1 number of positive components of x and y , respectively. Then (x,u ) 
is called a nondegenerate (degenerate) solution to P if 
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p + q = m - m^ (if p t q < m - m^) 
Theorem 5 (Uniqueness). Let (XjU^) be a unique, nondegenerate optimal 
solution to P. Then D has a unique optimal solution (UjX''') . 
The proofs to the above theorems are contained in Balas!s 
paper (2). 
2.3 Economic Interpretations 
Indivisible Resources 
One of the usual assumptions in economic theory is that resources 
or commodities can be measured by real numbers. Production functions, 
demand curves, and cost functions are assumed to be defined for real 
number arrays and to behave properly with respect to various criteria 
of continuity. Assumptions of this sort simplify economic analysis. 
They imply, however, an acceptance of commodity divisibility and ignore 
the difficulty or even impossibility, in practice, of using or producing 
fractional units of a commodity. In many instances, indivisible rather 
than divisible commodities (a "commodity" here may be either a service 
or a good) are the more realistic to deal with. 
Two possible reaons, why writers in economic theory rarely include 
indivisibilities in their analysis, might be the following: first, the 
tools of algebra and mathematical analysis are much less powerful in 
dealing with discrete quantities (variables and constants), whereas they 
are most useful in the case of continuous concave functions and convex 
sets. In analyzing indivisibilities, the types of functions with which 
one is concerned are usually discrete and neither concave nor convex; 
also, the sets on which these functions are defined are not usually 
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convex. Secondly, many writers argue that indivisible commodities would 
make no significant difference in their analysis. Either divisibility 
is assumed to be a sufficient approximation to the real world phenomena 
with which they are concerned or the analysis would be identical or at 
least similar if commodities were assumed to be dicrete. 
Frank (9), who has given a detailed discussion of this topic 
in a recent work, points out that the "effects of indivisibilities" tend 
to be finite regardless of scale. For a sufficiently large scale, the 
effects of indivisibilities are "averaged out," and their relevance 
is not so great. Sometimes, one might justifiably ignore them, but 
there are several important areas of economic analysis in which progress 
depends on the development of methods for solving or analyzing problems 
in the efficient allocation of indivisible resources. There are, for 
instance, practical decision problems such as determining suitable 
numbers of machine tools of various kinds within a plant, or choosing 
the number and sizes of dams in river valley development. In later 
chapters, we will deal with indivisible investment opportunities, where 
the financial decision maker of a firm is faced with the problem of 
selecting from a set of available investment projects, those that 
maximize a predetermined goal of the firm and satisfy various possible 
restrictions on budget, material, and other resources. Furthermore, 
indivisibilities are in many cases at the root of increasing returns 
to scale, whether arising within a plant or firm, or in relation to a 
number of firms through "external economies." 
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Pricing Concepts in the Theory of the Firm 
This section will be devoted to the introduction to the important 
concepts of shadow prices, marginal prices, competitive markets, 
opportunity costs, and others. These concepts will first be presented 
in a linear programming framework and then will be extended to the case 
of mixed or pure discrete programming models. 
Let us consider a firm that produces goods in various processes 
of production, and let m be the number of factors of production (resources) 
whose supply is limited. For a given process of production, let a_ 
units of resource i be required to produce one unit of good j. Then, the 
so-called "activity vector", a. = (a.., a . ) , tells how much of 
J 1 J my 
each resource is required to make one unit of good j. 
If we produce x.. units of good j (j refers.to a given good 
produced by a given production process), the variable x^ is called the 
"level" at which activity j operates. Let further b^ be the maximum 
amount of resource i available in the time period under consideration, 
and let c b e the profit on one unit of the good made by acitivity j. 
We now define our problem as the task of determining the levels at 
which the activities should be operated to maximize the firm's profit 
rate. 
To construct our linear programming model we use the further 
assumption that the firm sells its products in a purely competitive 
market. Pure competition implies that a large number of firms make 
the same product, and no firm can influence the market price. There­
fore, since our approach is essentially static, and since no interaction 
exists between producers and consumers, the maximization of the profit 
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rate at each instant of time is equivalent to maximizing the total 
profit over all time. 
Under the assumptions stated above, we can write our problem 
algebraically in the form 
max cx 
(LP) subject to 
Ax = b 
x = 0, 
where c and x are n-vectors consisting of elements c^ and x^ respec­
tively; b is a m-vector with elements b • and A is a m m matrix with 
J 3 i' x 
elements a... 
The physical dimensions of the variable x. are the units of some 
J 
goods produced for a given time period. The dimensions of b^ are units 
of resource i available in the given time period, the dimensions of the 
c.. are dollars per unit of good j. 
Consider now the dual problem of (LP) 
min ub 
(LD) subject to 
uA = c 
u ^ 0 , 
where u is a m-vector with elements u^. The dimensions of the dual 
variable u^ are dollars per unit of resource i. 
To each resource i there corresponds a dual variable u^ which, 
by its dimensions, is a price, or cost, or value to be associated with 
one unit of resource i. Thus, ub is the total value of the available 
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resources. The j-th constraint of (LD) reads 2J i_i aij ui ~ c j ' w l l e r e 
the left-hand side of this inequality is the value of the resources 
used in making one unit of product j. The dual problem determines the 
u. so that the total value of the resources is minimized, and the value 1 
of the resources used in producing one unit of j is at least as great 
as the profit received from selling one unit of j. 
The dual variables u. are referred to as dual variables, shadow 
1 
prices, or imputed values for the resources. Note that they have 
nothing to do with the actual costs of the resources; the c^ are profits, 
and thus the actual costs of the resources never appear. Instead, the 
dual variables may be considered as evaluators of the resources, which, 
in a certain sense, provide a way of measuring the contribution of 
each resource i to the profit, cx. 
Be omplementary slackness, for x. > 0 in the optimal solution, 
v m J 
) . i a. .u. = c , so that for the activities used, the value of the 
^ lrl 1J 1 j ' ' 
resources used to produce one unit of j is precisely equal to the 
profit. If the i-th primal constraint is a strict inequality (the 
corresponding slack variable is positive), so that not all of resource 
i is used, then u. = 0 , and the cost or value of that resource is 0. ' I 
We call such a resource a "free good." 
The valuation of the resources by means of the u^ is an oppor­
tunity cost valuation. This becomes evident by considering the 
following facts. At optimality, cx a ub, i.e. the maximum profit is 
equal to the minimum value of the resources. Now, if it were possible 
to increase or decrease the amount available of resource i by one 
unit, without changing the solution to the dual, the maximum profit 
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would be increased or decreased by u., i.e. here is the basis for an 
1 
opportunity cost interpretation; of course, if we actually change b^ 
to b^ + 1, the profit will not necessarily increase by u^ because the 
optimal basis may change. However, when cx is being maximized, u^ 
is a measure of the rate of change of cx with respect to b^, until 
the basis changes. When a resource is not fully utilized in an optimal 
solution cx will not change if the availability of the resource is 
increased indefinitely. Hence, u^ for this resource should be zero, 
which is in fact ensured by the complementary slackness conditions. 
The dual variables as presented here have applications in various areas, 
and their interpretation is one of our major concerns in the following 
chapters. 
Decentralized Decision Making 
The dual variables u^ have potential applications in cost accoun­
ting. Consider a large decentralized corporation which is broken down 
into a number of departments. Each department may have several products. 
In addition, there may exist a number of different activities for making 
a single product. These various departments jointly use manufacturing 
facilities and other services or resources which are in limited supply. 
Suppose that the chief executive has obtained an optimal solution to 
the linear programming problem for the entire corporation, and, there­
fore, knows which activities should be used and what their levels should 
be. 
Top management wishes to make sure that the department managers 
select the proper activities. However, this selection process should 
originate with the department managers and not come about as a result 
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of directions from top management, i.e. the decison process hould be 
decentralized. Suppose that to each resource which is short in supply 
we assign the cost u^, where u^ is the i-th dual variable in the optimal 
solution to the corporate problem referred to above. For each unit of 
resource i, a department manager must pay u^ (regardless of the actual 
cost of this resource). Then the cost of one unit of good i produced 
by activity j 1 S 2, i 1 aij ui = z j " ^ e n o w s u P P o s e that the department 
manager is paid c^ for each unit, where c_. is the unit profit of j. 
If z.. > 0^, the department manager will find that his department is 
losing money when activity j is operated at a positive level. There 
remains the problem of gettig the managers to operate these activities 
at a correct level. This cannot be done by means of the above costing 
procedure, and hence other approaches must be used. 
Dantzig and Wolfe (7) have developed a computational technique, 
called decomposition, that permits the solution of large and complex 
linear programs by solving a series of small size problems instead. In 
its economic interpretation, this is a procedure for decentralized 
decisions by a multi-division firm or a multi-sector economy. The method 
includes in its operations a coordinating mechanism which prevents the 
decentralized decisions from working at cross purposes. This mechanism 
employs as its instrument a generalized interpretation of the shadow 
prices of linear programming duality. 
To summarize, the decomposition approach constitutes a decision 
mechanism for an entire decentralized, but coordinated economic organi­
zation. However, the degree of autonomy of the divisional decision 
maker should not be overstated, as pointed out by Baumol and Quandt (5). 
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True, the calculation process is sufficiently localized that central 
management does not have to know anything about the internal techno­
logical arrangements of the division. But, in the final analysis, the 
output decisions are made and enforced by the central planner, though 
based on divisional plans and proposals. 
A Generalized Shadow-Price System for Discrete Programming 
leads in a natural way to an economic interpretation in which the 
shadow-price system of linear programming is replaced by a generalized 
shadow-price system. This generalized system consists of nonnegative 
dual prices, u^, associated with each constraint i, and unconstrained 
subsidies or penalties ŝ ., associated with each discrete variable 
(activity) j. 
To obtain the results indicated, Balas considers the pair of 
dual problems (dual in the sens of Balas's duality) 
Balasfs duality construction for discrete programming models 
min max cx + u y + u A x 
1 u X 
OP) subject to 
Ax + y = b 








ieM - M. 
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and 
1 1 1 A11 1 max min u b - v x + u A x 
1 
X u 
(D) subject to 
uA - v = c 
X j , ^ integer, jeN^ ie*^ 
unconstrained, jeN^ 
v. 
J = 0 , jeN - ̂  , 
which were the subject of our discussion in Section 2.2. 
Instead of trying now to interpret the meaning of the problem 
variables directly, Balas formulates, by means of a theorem, an equiva­
lent linear program to (P) and analyzes the properties of its optimal 
solution in terms of the discrete program. The following theorem has 
been stated and proved by Balas. For clarity, we repeat the proof, 
in more detail. 
Theorem 6. If (x,u^) and (u,x^) are optimal solutions to (P) and (D) 
respectively, then x is an optimal solution to the linear program 
max (c - s) 
(ELP) subject to 
A 2 < »2 A x = b 
x = 0 , 
2 21 22 
where A = (A ,A ) is the part of the matrix A that corresponds to 
2 linear dual variables u , and where s = (s.) is defined as 
J 
23 
ft. + v. 
(2.2) s. = J t. + min(o,v.) 
J I J J 
for jeN., such that x. > 0 
1 J 
for ieN., such that x. = 0 
1 J 
t. for jeN - N 1 ' 
with t . = - ) u.a. ., jeN. 
ieM, 
Proof: x is a feasible solution to (ELP), since the set of constraints 
in (ELP) is only a part of the constraint set of (P) and the additional 
discreteness restriction on a part of the variables are relaxed. 
The dual of (ELP) can be written as 
(ELD) 
min u b 
subject to 
2 A 2 
u A 
u = 
c + s 
0 . 
Using the definition equation (2.2) for the subsidy vector s, and sub-
-2 
stituting into (ELD), we see that u is feasible to (ELD) and that the 
following relations hold for both linear programs: 
(2.3) -2 2 2- -2 2 -u (b - A x ) = 0, ( c - f s - u A ) x z 0. 
The equations (2.3) are readily seen to be the complementary slackness 
conditions, what implies that x, U 2 are optimal to (ELP) and (ELD) respec' 
tively. Q.E.D. 
This theorem relates our general maximization problem (P) and the 
equivalent linear program (ELP) . 
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Let us now, in analogy to the linear model we used for the theory 
of the firm in the preceding chapter, consider the case when M^ = 0, i.e. 
when (P) is a mixed-integer linear program. This will now be written as 
1 1 2 2 max c x + c x 
(MIP) subject to 
A^x + A^x = b 
x X,x 2 ^ 0 
: integer, jet^ 
where (A^^^) = A. 
1 2 2 In this case, if we write s = (s , s ), we have s = 0, s. = v. for 
J J 
ieN. such that x. > 0, and s. = min(0,v.) for jeN., such that x. = 0 . 1 J J J 1 J 
Thus, (ELP) becomes 
, 1 L 1 2 2 max (c + s)x • c x 
(ELP) subject to 
A-̂ x* + ̂ x 2 = b 
x , x = 0 . 
From the results above it follows that, if (P) has an optimal 
solution, there exists a vector of prices u^ z 0, ieM, and subsidies or 
penalties s^, jeN^, with the following properties: 
(a) An optimal solution x to the mixed-integer program (MIP) 
is an optimal solution to the linear program (ELP); 
(b) uA^ = ĉ" <• s \ uA-2 — c 2, 
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(c) (uA^ - c - s )x = 0 , (uA^ - c )x = 0 , i.e. an activity 
is run at a positive level only if there is no loss associated with it; 
1 2 
(d) u(b - A^x - A 2 X ) = 0, i.e. if a price is positive, the 
associated resource (or commodity) is "scarce"; 
1 1 1 2 2 
(e) (c t s ) x t c x = ub, i.e. the total "value" of the 
(result of) activities is equal to the total imputed valued of the 
resources (commodities); 
(f) if the optimal solution x to (MIP) is unique and nondegenerate 
(as defined in Section 2 . 2 ) , then u and s''" are unique; 
(g) some of the acitivities that are not run at a positive leve 
may have to bear a penalty. 
Property (a) is a special case of the result of Theorem 6; (b) 
represents the constraint set of the dual to (ELP); (c) and (d) are com­
plementary slackness conditions; (e) expresses the symmetry relationship 
between primal and dual objective functions; (f) follows from the unique­
ness property of the general pair of dual problems (P) and (D); and (g) 
interprets the fact that s. — 0 for x. = 0 in the optimal solution. 
J J 
Since the relationships (a) through (g) are formulated for a pair 
of linear programs, the dual variables can be interpreted as regular 
shadow prices, and the concepts developed for the linear model of a 
profit-maximizing firm can be carried over. Here, however, this system 
of shadow prices is accompanied by a system of subsidies and penalties, 
which are used to modify the profits in the objective function of (MIP) 
according to the stated rule. Obviously, x need not be (is generally not) 
an optimal solution to the linear program obtained from (MIP) by 
abandoning the integrality conditions. Figure 1 shows an example for 
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such a situation in two dimensions, x^p and x̂ -j-p stand for the optimal 
solution to the linear and the mixed-integer program respectively. 
Figure 1. Two-dimensional Example with One 
Discrete and One Continuous Variable. 
Let C be the convex polytope defined by the constraints 
A^x + k^x. = b, x ,x = 0 . 
A feasible solution to (MIP) then must lie in C and satisfy the 
integrality constraints on the components of x'''. An optimal solution x 
to (MIP) lies either on a facet of C or on one of the extreme points 
of C. 
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Since the replacement of (c , c ) in the objective function of 
1 1 2 
(MIP) by (c + s ,c ) causes x to become optimal with respect to this 
new objective function defined on C, the meaning of this replacement is 
that of changing the slope of the objective-function-hyperplane so as to 
make it parallel to the facet of C containing x. If this facet contains 
more than the single point x, then all noninteger solutions lying on it 
are also optimal with respect to the new objective function 
1 1 1 1 2 2 
(cx + s x + c s ) , and form alternate optimal solutions to (ELP). 
Although the properties (a) through (g) were stated for a pair 
of linear programs, the concept of a "free good" or a "free resource" 
has to be modified. Relation (d) does not ensure that only free 
resources have a zero price. In linear programming, because of the implied 
infinite divisibility of all inputs and all outputs, the appearance of 
a zero dual variable is generally, but not always, associated with a non-
binding constraint in a way which suggests that the omission of the 
indicated constraint would not affect the optimal solution. More precisely, 
the.indicated constraint can be omitted if and only if its associated 
dual variable is zero in every optimal solution. 
In our case of indivisible resources for (MIP), this need not be 
the case. Specifically, an original constraint may not be active at the 
optimum to the mixed-integer program, i.e. y^ > 0 and hence u^ = 0, for 
some ieM, but its omission would fail to yield the same optimal solution. 
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Figure 2. Case of Two Integer x 
In Figure 2, we consider for simplicity the case of only two 
integer variables. The function to be maximized is assumed to increase 
in the direction of the arrow. Then, clearly, the optimal lattice point 
is R. Even though the solution space is two-dimensional, all three 
restrictions here are essential. If restriction EF is omitted, the 
optimum shifts to lattice point S; and if restriction CD is omitted, the 
optimum shifts to lattice point U. Although none of the restrictions 
in Figure 2 is acually binding at the optimal solution, they are all 
necessary to achieve the optimal point R. In linear programming, as 
already mentioned, a zero dual price is associated with a basic slack 
variable, i.e. a constraint with excess capacity. In integer programming, 
there is no assurance that a restriction is not essential even with the 
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appearance of the slack of a constraint in the optimal basis at a posi­
tive level. Let us define therefore a "free good" in the context of 
our mixed-integer programming problem as an excess resource that is 
not only characterized by a zero dual variable, but also by the fact 
that the primal constraint associated with this resource is redundant. 
The generalized shadow-price system discussed is not sufficient 
by itself to lead to an optimal integer solution (integer in the required 
components) through decentralized decision making. The reason is that 
after the dual prices u^ have been announced by the central authority 
of the corporation and after the single divisions have evaluated their 
investment opportunities, the ranking order thus established may be 
altered by interference of headquarters in form of subsidies and penalties 
which are by-products of solving a corporate programming problem. It 
will be shown, however, in one of the following chapters that under 
certain conditions decentralization may be obtained through further 
analysis. 
Alternate Approaches to Pricing in Integer Programming 
Gomory and Baumol (12) proposed a process to bo tain dual evalua-
tors of integer programming constraints. These quantities, which they 
have called the "recomputed duals," assign values exclusively to the 
original constraints, distributing to these the duals associated with the 
additional constraints of the cutting planes in their algorithm. The 
recomputed duals are characterized by the following properties: 
Their numerical values generally depend on the choice of the 
cutting planes, i.e. on the path utilized in the computations, and an 
explicit record of the added constraints is needed for performing the 
computation. 
They share with the duals of linear programming the property 
that they "price out" the utilized activities so as to leave them 
profitless, while assigning losses to activities rejected in the optimal 
solution. In doing so, they assign "subsidies" to some activities. 
They do not measure the effects of discrete changes in the require­
ments vector, i.e. in terms of the right hand side, and in general, do 
not satisfy the linear programming duality relation (equality for the 
values of the primal and dual solution). 
The total value of the final output goods is not equal to the 
total imputed value of all original capacities. This is, in fact, one 
of the crucial differences between integer and linear programming: 
an integer problems, not all inputs receiving positive prices are 
completely used up in the optimal solution. As a result, for any 
problem in which recomputation does not alter the final goods' prices, 
the Baumol and Gomory prices will impute to the original capacities a 
value in excess of the total value of the outputs of the industry in 
the optimal integer solution. 
Hence, these recomputed dual prices function only partially as 
shadow prices. They do not assign a zero value to constraints whose 
complete omission would not alter the integer optimum. A zero value 
may be assigned to a constraint which is "absolutely redundant," i.e. 
one whose omission from any subset of the original constraints would 
not alter the ability of the subset to produce the integer optimum. 
Alternatively, a zero value may he assigned to a constraint which is 
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redundant only given the other constraints, and hence, it may receive 
a positive dual value in a solution utilizing a different subset of 
constraints. 
Whenever a subset of original constraints is sufficient to 
generate the required cutting planes, and hence yields the same integer 
optimum as would the complete set of restrictions, then the computation 
corresponds to a process of backward pivoting, and the duals so obtained 
are independent of the choice of the cutting planes. However, even in 
this situation it may be that several subsets of n constraints are 
sufficient in which case more than one set of "unique" duals results. 
Alcaly and Klevorick (1) attempted to alter and extend the Gomory 
and Buamol method of recomputation of the dual prices for integer pro­
grams to make these prices more economically satisfying. As an example, 
they consider the problem facing economy-level planners who are deter­
mining the outputs of an industry that consists of n firms, each opera­
ting under identical technological conditions. They consider the indus­
try problem in anticipation of the nature of the subsidies and penalties 
that will energe in the solution of the problem. 
One of the main problems of the Baumol and Gomory dual prices is 
the fact, that they do not accurately represent the marginal revenue 
products of the inputs and that they often given zero prices to goods 
which the economist does usually not consider free goods. 
Alcaly and Klevorick's system of generalized dual prices under 
certain conditions provides a set of prices more consistent with the 
economical concept of a free good, which we discussed earlier. They 
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note, however, that in the case of integer programming this definition 
of a free good is itself open to criticism. They finally mention the 
possibility that in the case of decentralized planning under conditions 
of an integer programming nature, the notion of a single set of prices, 
to which the economist has become so attached, may have to be abandoned. 
An Example Problem 
To illustrate the concepts developed in this chapter, we will 
present now a numerical example, involving two discrete and one contin­
uous variable. The primal problem under consideration is a maximization 
problem, subject to three inequality constraints, i.e. we deal with a 
mixed-integer programming problem. 
(A) Mixed-Integer Program 
max z = 2x^ * 2x^ • 5x^ 
(MIP) subject to 
3x^ t 2x2 * K3 ~ ^ 
-x^ + x 2 + ^ x3 - 8 
xl + x 2 * 2 x 3 ~ ̂  
X p X 2 integer, = 0 
x 3 - ° • 
By one of the existing methods, here also by exhaustive enumera­
tion, the optimal solution of this problem can be determined as: 
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x x - 1 x 3 = 9/4 
x 2 = 0 z z 13 1/4 = 53/4 . 
(B) Linear Program 
After relaxing the integrality constraints, we obtain the 
following problem 
max 2x^ + 2x^ • 5x^ 
(LP) subject to 
3x.̂  + 2x 2 4- x^ - 6 
-x^ + x 2 *• 4x^ - 8 
xl " x 2 + 2 x 3 ~ ̂  
xl' X2' x3 ~ ̂  * 
Three iterations, using the Simplex Method, yield the following 
optimal solution: 
z + - 14 x* = 1 | 
*2 = 0 
+ 30 
X3 1 13 
This solution is obviously different from the solution to (A). 
(C) Equivalent Linear Program 
According to the rules developed in earlier parts of this chapter, 
the equivalent linear program to (MIP) has the form 
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max (2 + si) xi + ( 2 + s2^ x2 * 5 x 3 
(ELP) subject to 
3x^ + 2x^ + - 6 
-x^ 1 - x 2 + 4x^ - 8 
Xl + X2 + 2 x 3 ~ 6 
Xl' X2' X3 ~ ̂  
To determine the subsidies (penalties) s^> s2 w e have to solve 
the dual of (MIP), (DIP), which reads: 
max min 6m^ + + 6m^ - n^x^ - n 2 X 2 
x^, X 2 m^, , 
subject to 
(DIP) 3ml - m 2 + - = 2 
2m^ + - m^ - n 2 = 2 
ml + ^ m2 + 2 m 3 " n3 = ^ 
n^ > m^ , , ~ 0 
x^,X2 integer 
n^,^ unrestricted 
This max-min optimization problem becomes a regular linear pro­
gramming problem, if we use the optimal solution x^,X2 }x^ to (MIP) . 
Incorporating the first two constraints of the dual (which correspond 
to the integer primal variables x^tx^) into the objective function, we get; 
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min 6m^ • 8m2 • 6m^ - (3m^ - m^ • m^ - 2)x^ 
m^,m 2,m 3 - (2m^ + m^ + m^ - 2)x 2 
subject to 
m^ + 4m 2 + 2m^ - n^ = 5 
m^, m 2, m^ = 0 . 
Using x^ = 1 , x 2 = 0 , the problem becomes 
min 6m^ + 8m 2 + 6m^ - (3m^ - m 2 + m^ - 2) 
m l , m 2 , i n 3 = 3m 1 + 9m 2 + 5m3 * 2 = w 
subject to 
ml * ̂ m2 * 2 m 3 ~ ~* 
m^ , m 2, m^ — 0 . 
This problem has the optimal solution 
m^ = 0 m^ = 0 
m 2 =5/4 w = 53/4 . 
We use this result to evaluate the dual surplus variables in (DIP): 
n^ = 3m^ - m 2 + - 2 = - 13/4 
n 2 = 2m^ + m 2 - - 2 = - 3/4 
n3 = ml * ̂ m2 + 2 m 3 " 5 = 0 . 
Applying the rules stated in the preceding chapter, we now are 
able to evaluate the subsidies (penalties) in (ELP): 
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x^ = 1 = = - 13/4 
x 2 r 0 s 2 = m i n(6>n 2) = - 3/4 , 
i.e. the activities 1 and 2 are both penalized, whereas activity 3 remains 
unaffected, since it soccresponds to a continuous variable. Inserting 
these values into (ELP), it becomes 
max (2 - 13/4) x± * (2 - 3/4)x2 t 5x 3 = 5/4xx + 5/4x2 t 5x 3 = 
subject to 
3x.̂  + 2x 2 t x.̂  = 6 
-x^ + x 2 + 4x^ ^ g 
x^ - x 2 + 2x.̂  = 6 , x^,x 2 >x^ = 0 
This problem has alternate optimal solutions. One of these optimal 
solutions is: 
x x z 1 x 3 = 9/4 
x 2 = 0 z L = 10 , 
i.e. the optimal solution to (MIP) is also optimal to (ELP) . The 
difference in the value of the objective function is caused by the 
different objective function coefficients. 
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CHAPTER III 
WEINGARTNER1S BASIC CAPITAL BUDGETING MODEL 
3.1 Introduction 
The analysis for investment decisions by firms has become more 
sophisticated through the application of new mathematical tools. In 
particular, the use of mathematical programming permits the whole set 
of investment alternatives to be considered as a program. Complex inter­
relationships among investment projects can be stated and analyzed at 
one time as can the financial relationships imposed by capital rationing. 
Models which optimize project selection within an investment program 
allow simultaneous and consistent evaluation of alternatives, even when 
projects are not independent, and despite capital expenditure and other 
resource limitations. Among the problems arising in the formulation of 
such models is the question of which discount rate to use for calculating 
present values or future values of the cash flows considered. It has been 
shown that in the presence of certain market imperfections, the use of 
the company's cost of capital may not lead to an optimization of its 
economic objectives (15). 
In this chapter, we will deal with a capital budgeting model that 
avoids the mentioned problem of determining or defining the cost of 
capital, simply by assuming that the appropriate discount rates are 
available. First, the linear programming formulation, due to Wein-
gartner (15), will be presented, and then Balas's duality concept will 
be used to cope with the additional assumption of indivisible investment 
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projects. This assumption leads to a formulation of the model in the 
form of a pure integer program. Using the results of the preceding 
chapter, an economic interpretation of the optimal solution will be 
given that differs significantly from that of the original model. 
The situation which Weingartner considers in his Basic Model (15) 
involves the allocation of limited amounts of capital among a specified 
set of n investment opportunities, with the goal of selecting those 
projects whose total present value is a maximum, but whose total outlay 
in each period falls within the budget limitations. A planning horizon, 
T, dividied into a finite number of periods, is considered and it is 
assumed that, within a certain period, the exogenous and internal con­
dition remain constant. This implies that some situations may require 
a large number of periods in order to provide a realistic representation 
of the real world. This goal of obtaining a good approximation of 
existing conditions, however, will have to be weighed against the 
increased size of the problem and hence the probably increased difficulty 
of solution that a larger number of periods would cause. 
The model considered is deterministic, i.e. all information about 
cash flows and budget limitations up to the planning horizon is assumed 
to be known with certainty. As already mentioned above, it is also 
(implicitly) assumed that the necessary discount rates are given. 
3.2 The Linear Programming Formulation 
Letting 
be the costs of project j in time period t, 




be the present value of all cash flows (revenues 
and costs) associated with project j, and 
x. be the fraction of project j to be undertaken 
^ (x. is the decision variable), 
the mathematical statement of the problem is 
(LP) subject to 
I n t = 1, T 
0 n 
The upper limits of unity on each x^ exclude the possibility of 
multiple projects, the omission of such a limitation would lead to allo­
cating the entire budget to multiples of the most desirable projects. 
The model looks implicitly at all combinations of projects, not just 
one project at a time, to select that set whose total present value is 
a maximum; it does not eliminate fractional projects from the solution 
since that would require an additional binary restriction on the x ̂ . 
Weingartner (15) has shown that an optimum, if it exists, can always 
be achieved with at most T fractional projects. 
3.3 The Dual Linear Program 
As discussed in the preceding chapter, the dual program provides 
a valuable economic interpretation. In our case, (LP) has a dual of 
the form 
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(LD) subject to 
n 
t = 1, T. 
p , the optimal value of p , represents the present value of an 
additional dollar added to the budget in period t, assuming optimal use 
of the budget. It is a "marginal" value, in the sense that it is an 
increment and it depends on the optimal use of the indicated increment. 
If the p , the shadow or opportunity costs of the budget constraints, are 
nonzeor, it follows (by complementary slackness) that the budgets are 
critical (binding). However, these optimal shadow costs will differ from 
period to period depending on the ability of the firm to utilize an 
additional dollar of the (currently) submarginal investments in each 
period. 
remaining variables M«. are associated with the n constraints x. = 1, and 
J J 
will be shown to play a role of budget evaluators. At optimality, we 
obtain the relation 
When project j is acceptable, so that x^ > 0, the corresponding dual 
constraint is met exactly, and inequality (3.1) becomes an equality which 
can be read as: the "value" of an accepted project j is the amount by 
which its present value b. exceeds the sum of the discounted outlays as 




evaluated at the corresponding dual shadow prices of each budget 
T 
year. 
If the given linear program is solved by the Simplex Method, 
and if we denote the evaluators z. - b. by o~., then 
J J J 
(3.2) v l ^ V t j ^ j 
and 
V T -(3.3) a. = / p c . + |i. - b. . J L KT TJ J J 
With each x., there is an associated slack variable t., defined J J 
by the relation 
(3.4) t. = 1 - x. 
J J 
If ^ > 0, then = 0 , so that (3.3) may be written as 
V T -
J- = / P J (3.5) a, P f cc t. - b. = 0 . 
If also 0 < Xj < 1 holds, i.e j is a proper fractional project, the 
relation (3.3) becomes 
T 
(3.6) . = Y O . - b. = 0; 
J ^ t=l * t j J 
this means that in such a case, an accepted project must fulfill the 
condition that its present value, b^, equals the present value of all 
V T -
future expenditures, / P^c^ .. 
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Weingartner (15) calls such (proper) fractional projects, which 
necessarily imply relation (3.6), "marginal for accpetance." In the 
event that (3.6) is met, but also x^ = 0, he calls the project "marginally 
rejected." 
If, finally, 
the project j just necessarily be totally rejected, so that x^ = 0. Such 
porjects show a net present value of benefits which is less than the 
present value of the expenditures that must be undertaken. 
vaiables, P - . . and o \ , appear to be tools for ranking all projects con­
sidered. Since the linear programming solution takes into account not 
only the goodwill of the individual projects, but also their inter­
relationships through the budget constraints, the ranking order, thus 
established, may well differ from ranking by present value or rate of 
return methods. Some of the diffuculties arising in the use and inter­
pretation of the linear programming solution are: 
in Chapter II, and thus fractional solutions are meaningless. Further­
more, the maximum possible number of fractional projects increases as 
explicit interrelationships between the projects are taken into account 
These aspects point into the direction of an integer programming formu­
lation. In order to cope with project indivisibilities, we add binary 
constraints for the x. and use Balas's duality concept for a closed 
(3.7) 
Summarizing, we can say that the optimal values of the dual 
There are projects that are essentially discrete, as discussed 
J 
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formulation of primal and dual problems as well as for the economic 
interpretation of their optimal solutions. 
3.4 Integer Programming Formulation of Primal and 
Dual according to Balas's Duality Concept 
As indicated in the preceding section, integer programming may be 
applied to Weingartner's Basic Model (LP) to produce the optimal set of 
integral investment projects under budget constraints for the given time 
horizon. The model then appears in the form 
V n 
max / . i b.x. 
(P) subject to 
) n c. .x. = C , t = 1, .. ., T 
y 0 or 1, j = 1, n 
This is a pure 0-1 integer programming problem, which may also 
be written in the form of a regular integer programming problem, 
including the upper bound constraints on the x ̂ . In Balas's qualifi­
cation of the special cases, (P) belongs to type (b) , i.e. M^ = 0, 
N - = 0. The variables x.., which represent the decision of executing 
or not executing project j, take only values of 0 and 1, i.e. projects 
are either fully accepted for fully rejected. 
Based on the concepts discussed in Chapter II, we are able to 
formulate a dual problem (D) of the form 
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v n max min 
(D) subject to 
T 
in ) p^c. - ) M-.x. 
I t = l °tjpt " ^ = bj> 
P t 
j = 1, . . ., n 
t = 1, T 
x, : 0 or 1 j = l , ...,n 
J 
MJ unrestricted in sign. 
(D) is a mixed-integer 0-1 optimization problem of the type 
max-min over the nonnegative orthant, but is otherwise unconstrained 
since is unrestricted in sign. The dual variables P.fc and the dual 
surplus variables K are continuous, the |Jk being unrestricted in sign 
since they correspond to the integer constrained primal variables x.. 
("partial relaxation of the constraints"). 
Using the notational correspondence 
Weingartner 
( P V 
( C 1 ' 
•c 11 • 
Balas 
, x ) n 
1 
X 








*T1 * "Tn 
21 
(P) and (D) read in Balas's notation 
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1 1 max c x 
(P 1) subject to 
A 2 1 1 < -i 2 A x = b 
Xj = 0 or 1, jeN^, and 
2,2 1 1 max min u b - v x 
1 2 x u 
(D 1) subject to 
2.21 1 1 
U A - V ; C 
x. = 0 or 1, jeN-
v. unrestricted, jeN- . J 1 
12 22 
Since A ,A = 0, the constraint qualification is met. To avoid 
the difficulties that arise in establishing a "pricing system" for the 
problem (P) and (D), we will use the approach presented in Chapter II, 
ie.e where a system of (linear programming) nonnegative shadow prices 
u^ is combined with unconstrained quantities s^, subsidies or penalties, 
depending on their sign. In a case like the one under consideration, 
where the primal is a pure 0-1 integer programming problem, we are able 
to derive some additional properties using the special structure of the 
model. 
Let us consider (P 1) and (D 1) in Balas's notation and let (x^), 
-1 -2 
and (x ,u ) be a pair of optimal solutions to (P 1) and (D 1) respectively 
In accordance with Theorem 6, we formulate the equivalent linear program 
(ELP 1), for which any optimal solution to (P 1), hence also (x*), is 
optimal: 
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, 1 1.1 max (c + s )x 
(ELP1) subject to 
A x - b 
1 x = 1 
X j = 0 jeN^ 
where I is an n^ x n^ identity matrix. The dual of (ELP') has the 
form 
2 2 
min (u b + w.l) 
(ELD*) subject to 
2.21 T > 1 1 u A • w.l = c + s 
u ,w = 0 
3.5 Properties of Primal and Dual Problems and Economic 
Interpretation of the Optimal Solutions 
As opposed to the linear programming formulation, discussed in 
the first part of this chapter, there is no immediate interpretation 
of the dual variables in terms of shadow prices for problem (D). As 
pointed out in the preceding chapter, however, an "equivalent linear 
program" can be constructed for which the optimal solution to (P) is also 
optimal. This linear program and its dual then provide a means of inter­
preting the primal and dual variables, at optimality, of (P) and (D) 
in terms of "generalized shadow prices" and "subsidies" and "penalties". 
Before pursuing this route, we first state some interesting properties 
of (P) and (D) which follow from Balas's theorems 1 to 5 directly. 
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Theorem 1 (Involution) holds in the same .form as in the general 
case. 
Since the vector of primal slack variables, (y^> •••> y^)> is 
componentwise separable with respect to the primal decision vector 
(x^, x n ) , Theorem 2 (Saddle-Point) holds. Therefore, if (P) has an 
optimal solution (x^, x^), there exists a set of dual variables 
(p^, p,P such that (p^, p^; x^, x^) is an optimal solution 





Z n r ~ t 1 < r - i n 
b.x. = max min / p C - / M-.x. 
1=1 x. t=l 1=1 J J J t 
Z n r-i T \— i T 
b.x. = max min L P.C - ) (/ c. . p. - b.) x., 
1=1 x. 1=1 t=l J J t 
i.e. the present value of all accepted projects is, at optimality, equal 
to the "value" of the resources minus the amount by which the value of 
all cash outlays exceeds the present value of all accepted projects 
(both evaluated with the optimal dual variables p ) . Since both the 
maximization and the max-min optimization processes in (3.8) are to 
be understood as subject to the relevant constraint sets of primal and 
dual problems, (3.8) can also be written as 
Z n ' r - y T T ~A n —̂, T 
Y J = I p'tct - I ( L ctjP t - V x j • 
j =l J J tzl j=l t=l J J J 
which reduces to 
T p i N O i 
(3.9) I p C .- I I c p 
tsl C C j.l t.l J 
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Relation (3.9) relates to the (optimal) dual variables with the corres 
ponding budgets and cash flows. 
Furthermore, the function F(x^.,Pt), defined by 
(3.10) F(x P t) «I " b * T P tC t P t l " c x 
j=l t=l t = l Jrl J J 
V n V T 
= L V i • L pt yt j=l 3 2 t=l 
trl* t ^ = 1 J J 
has a saddle-point at (x^...^ ; p 1 > . . . ,p T ) : 
(3.11) F(x ,p.t) =F(x j ,p" t ) -F(x j } p t ) , 
for all x.eX(y t). X(yfc) is the set of all x. that satisfy the constraint 
Z n 2 
c .x. = C - y , all t, with y still standing for the optimal 
Jrl J J 
value. 
The saddle-point property (3.11) of the function F(x^,p t) has a 
possible interpretation in terms of a two-person zero-sum game, where 
F(Xj,Pt) represents a partly discrete (in the x..), partly continuous 
(in the Pfc) payoff-matrix. Player I has all x^eX(yt) as his possible 
strategies, whereas Player II can choose between all P f c values that 
satisfy the dual constraint set. 
If we substitute from the definition of F(x^,Pt) and write (3.11) 




Relation (3.12) may be interpreted as follows: A value p 
has been placed on the unused funds y in any time-period t, and Player 
I wants to act so as to maximize the project returns and the value of 
these unused funds; the best he can get is equality with the right-hand 
side of (3.12) when he plays the optimal strategy x... Then, the value 
of the unused funds will go to zero, a result that will be obtained below, 
too, using the complementary slackness conditions. 
Player II, in (3.13), faces the following situation: A certain 
(the optimal) set of investment opportunities has been selected which 
require certain funds and determine the amounts of the unused funds in 
any period. He wants to select among all feasible values p̂  those that 
minimize the value of the fixed unused funds. Player I and Player II 
may be identified with two different departments in a firm whose goal 
is to determine the optimal investment policy and the optimal value of 
the dual evaluators. 
Applying Theorem 4, we find: If (x^, x^) and (p^,..., pfc; 
x, ,...,x ) are optimal solutions to (P) and (D) respectively, then 
(3.14) 
and, since all terms in the sum are nonnegative, 
(3.15) Ptyt = o, all t. 
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These complementary slackness conditions differ from those in 
linear programming in that optimality is a sufficient, but not necessary 
condition for them to hold; consequently, the solution procedure used 
has to provide other means of identifying the optimal solution. 
If we finally assume that (x^, x^) is a unique, nondegenerate 
optimal solution to (P), then also (D) has a unique, nondegenerate optimal 
solution. 
Lemma 1. Any optimal solution to the 0-1 integer programming problem 
(P 1) is an extreme point of the constraint set of (ELP 1). 
Proof. Assume that x +, the optimal solution to (P 1), is not an extreme 
point of (ELP1) . Then x* can be written as a convex combination of the 
extreme points of (ELP 1). 
-1 -2 -m 
Let the optimal extreme point solutions to (ELP1) be x ,x ,...,x ; 
then 
Z m Y"1 M 
_ g.x1, with I ^ g. = 1, g. ^ 0 . i=l i.l 
Suppose x* • 1, then 
1=1 
which implies 
x^ = 1, for all g. t 0. 




in contradiction with the result above. Suppose now x^ = 0, then 
m 
= 0 , / 8 • x^ 
Z j i = l 1 3 
which implies 
x* = 0, for all g. / 0 , 
j I 
i.e. for all terms that are part of the convex combination. 
It follows therefore that x + cannot be represented as a convex 
combination of extreme points x 1 other than the trivial combination 
involving x + itself, since x* is an extreme point of the set x^ - 1, 
x. = 0 , and cannot be written as a convex combination of the other 
J 
extreme points in this set. Q.E.D. 
For a better illustration of the result in Lemma 1, i.e. that the 
optimal solution to (P 1) is an extreme point of C, the convex polyhedron 
formed by the constraint set of (ELP 1), we consider the two possible 
situations that may occur: 
(a) The upper bounds on the x^ are more restrictive than the 
structural constraints; then the convex hull of the constraint set of 
(P 1) is identical with the convex set forming C, i.e. the extreme points 
of C are 0-1 integer points; or: 
(b) Some (since we assume the existence of an optimal solution 
with x ^ 0, not all) of the structural constraints are more restrictive 
than the corresponding upper bounds on the x..; then the integral valued 
optimal solution to (P 1) is one of those remaining extreme points where 
the structural constraints are not active. 
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As discussed in Chapter II, the replacement of ĉ" in the objec-
1 1 -1 tive function of (P') by (c • s ) causes x to become optimal with 
respect to this new objective function. The objective function is now 
defined on the convex polyhedron C. We can rewrite the constraint set 
on which C is defined in equation form, by introducing slack variables 
y^, i = 1, nv,, and t̂., j = 1, n^, as follows 
, 1 1.1 max (c + s )x 
(ELP") subject to 
,21 1 2 2 A x + y = b 
I x1 . t 1 = 1 
x V . t ^ O . 
The above constraint set contains * equations, thus we 
need ir̂  • n^ variables to form a basis. Since the optimal solution 
x''" to (P') is integer valued, the corresponding optimal basis for (ELP") 
will contain exactly n. variables, x. or t., from the set of constraint 
1 J J 
equations; the remaining ir̂  variables in the basis will consequently be 
the y^. Hence, though the optimal solution of (ELP") need generally 
not be integer, the one which is feasible to (P') can be found by intro­
ducing all y^ into the basis. Note that this result holds only for the 
special case of pure 0-1 integer programming problems (P'). 
After this discussion of some additional properties of (P'), we 
turn to our specific problem under consideration, and write the equivalent 
linear program in Weingartner's notation as 
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max ) (b. + s.)x. 
(ELP) subject to 
J = 1 V J ^ T ' 
t = 1, T 
X j = l , j : 1, . .., n 
X j = 0 , j = l , ...,n, 
(ELP) has dual of the form 
T Z l r-» n 
t = l * * j=l J 
(ELD) subject to 
T 
) P,_c . • w. - b. f s ., j = 1 , n 
t=l 1 J J J 
P _,w. = 0, all j and all t. 
Denoting the surplus variables in (D) by p. , and applying the 
formation rules for the subsidies and penalties s.., we obtain 
s. = p.., ifx. > 0 , and J J J 
s. = min (0,M<.), if x. = 0, J J J 
- V T 
where = / c . p. - b. * 0 is the value of [i. in the optimal 
J ts\ 1 1 J 
solution to (D). Then, from Balas's Theorem 6, we obtain: If (P) has 
an optimal, 0-1 valued integer solution (x^, x^) , there exists a 
vector of dual shadow prices p , dual project evaluators w., and 
t J 
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subsidies or penalties s^, with the following properties: 
(a) Any optimal solution (x^, x^) to (P) is an optimal 
solution to (ELP) . 
T 
(b) Z CLC^ . + w. = b . * s., all i. i.e. the funds absorbed 
t=l 3 3 3 3 
by the utilization of the reousrces plus the funds assigned to the exclu­
sion of multiple projects (upper bounds of 1 on the x..) are never less 
than the "recomputed profits," b^ + s_.. In other words, none of the 
projects yields a positive "profit" in the sense defined above, 
y n r^T 
(c) / (/ . t w . - b . -s.)x. = 0 . This condition may 
jrl t-l 3 3 3 J J 
be split up into n equations, since all terms in the summation over the 
project index j are nonnegative: 
<Z T = 1 P t c tj * w j - b j - sj> xj = 0, J = 1, .... n, 
i.e. a project is accepted only if the acceptance does not cause a "loss." 
Z T n 
o_(C - ) c .x.) = 0, or, split up into single terms, 
t=l j=l 3 3 
r-> n 
q.(Ct " 2 , c .x.) = 0» t = 1, . . ., T. This linear 
j=l J J 
programming complementary slackness condition is identical to the com­
plementary slackness condition from Theorem 4 for (P) and (D). In 
r-t n 
addition to that, however, the analysis yields here ) w.(l - x.) = 0 , 
jrl J 3 
or, by the same argument as above, wj(l ~ xj) = 0> j = i> •••> n> i.e. 
if the evaluator w^ is positive the project j must be accepted, whereas 
for Wj r 0, it may or may not be accepted. 
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Y n r - < T r - < n 
, v / . ,(b. + s.)x. = ) p C t + / w.; 
(e) ^-j=l v J 2 2 t-1 j-1 J 
this duality relation between the primal and dual objective functions 
shows that the system of dual prices p t and project evaluators w^ 
together with the appropriate system of subsidies and penalties s.. 
evaluates the accepted projects in a way which is consistent with the 
total value of the investment program. 
As already pointed out, the dual variables now can be inter­
preted as regular shadow prices, using the concepts of "marginal costs." 
It will be shown in a later chapter, for the more general case of a 
mixed-integer program, that not only the primal optimal solution of (P) 
is optimal to (ELP), but that also the optimal solution of the dual (D) 
is optimal to (ELD). 
The above results show that 
, and (i) if x. > 0, s . = p.. * 0 
J J J 
(ii) if x. r 0, s. = 0 . 
J J 
In other words, this reads: 
(i) accepted projects may be penalized, subsidized, 
or left unchanged; 
(ii) rejected projects may have to bear a penalty. 
These penalities or subsidies are a direct consequence of the 
integrality requirement on x . They might cause a different ranking 
of projects than a linear programming approach to the capital budgeting 
problem, where indivisibilities are not taken into consideration. 
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CHAPTER IV 
WEINGARTNER1S TERMINAL WEALTH MODEL 
4.1 Introduction 
The complexity of the capital budgeting problem derives from the 
fact that any set of actions taken today has consequences at later times, 
and the opportunities available at later dates are realted to decisions 
being implemented currently. While the only decisions that need to be 
made today are those that require action today, these decisions cannot 
ignore the range of opportunities at later times. More specific, the 
decision to utilize resources for the acquisition of assets which yield 
flows of revenue, but which cannot be turned back into cash or liquid 
assets without some cost calls for careful analysis. 
Using Weingartner's Basic Model for allocating funds to invest­
ment opportunities under fixed spending ceilings involved two substantial 
difficulties. One was determining the budget limits themselves, and the 
other one was the choice of a discount rate for the purpose of calcu­
lating present values of the projects and their outlays. Therefore, 
Weingartner (15) constructed the Basic Horizon Model (or Terminal Wealth 
Model) in which some of the quantities that are inputs for the Basic 
Model are determined by the model simultaneously with the investment 
decisions. 
As in the case of the Basic Model, we will first summarize the 
main features of the linear model and then consider the consequences 
of additional 0-1 restrictions on some of the variables. Several 
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interesting properties of this model will be derived and an acceptance 
criterion for the suggested projects will be developed. The discussion 
will be concluded by developing a procedure that allows a certain 
degree of decentralized decision making in a multi-department organiza­
tion. 
The model considers the "value of the firm" as of some future 
time, T, called horizon time. It maximizes this "terminal wealth" of 
the firm, subject to a cash balance restriction. Beforehand, T must be 
selected as the point in time prior to which outlays and revenues of 
potential investments are stated explicitly, but beyond which the actual 
flows associated with these investments are collapsed into a single 
quantity, the horizon values. Financial transactions are introduced 
into the model by means of lending and borrowing without limit at some 
stated rates of interest r^ t and , t = 1,...,T. Both lending and 
borrowing are accomplished by means of renewable one-year contracts, 
where, by convention, all interest is payable at the end of the year. 
Letting 
a . be the net cash flow obtainable from acceptance of project j 
4.2 The Linear Terminal Wealth Model 
at time t; 
a. 
J 
be the time T present value of post T cash flows, if any, 
from project j; 
be the amount of cash made available from projects outside 
this analysis and from other outside sources at time t; 
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^ t = 1 • rXt' w ^ e r e rXt ^ s t* i e ^ e n^l nS rate of interest from 
time t to t * 1; 
t>t = 1 + r^ t > where r^ t is the borrowing rate of interest from 
time t to t t 1; 
be the decision variable for the fraction of project 
j adopted; 
w be the decision variable for the cash to be borrowed 
from time t to t + 1; 
v be the decision variable for the cash to be lent from 
time t to t • 1, 
the mathematical statement of the problem is 
max I a x • v - w 
J=l 
(LP) subject to 
-) a .x. - A v . + v. <-*. . til t-1 t-1 t 
3=1 
V l V l " Wt = M f t = 1""' T 
v t , W t ~ ° ' t = 1, ...,T 
0 = x.. = 1 , j=l,...,n. 
The T cash balance restrictions in this model are to be under­
stood as follows: the net cash outflow to projects minus the cash 
inflow from time t - 1 loans plus the cash outflow from time t loans 
plus the cash outflow for time t - 1 borrowing minus the cash inflow from 
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time t borrowing must be less or equal to the cash available from out­
side sources at time t. Although no upper bounds on the amounts borrowed 
in each period are included, we do not deal in a perfect market since 
borrowing and lending rate are (in general) different. 
net amount of financial assets accumulated at the horizon, v^ - w^, 
and the post horizon cash flows, discounted back to the horizon. To the 
restrictions in (LP) one may add those expressing relationships of 
complementarity and competitiveness between projects (mutually exclusive, 
contingent projects, etc.). The model may be extended by including 
restrictions on the amounts borrowed, either in form of limiting con­
straints on the wfc or by using a rising supply curve for funds; in the 
latter case, the higher rates of interest associated with larger amounts 
borrowed can be interpreted as a form of risk premium. This generaliza­
tion as well as the addition of a dividend policy will be accomplished 
by one of the following models in this research. 
The objective function contains basically two components, the 
4.3 The Dual Linear Program 
The Terminal Wealth Model (LP) has a dual of the form 
min 
(LD) subject to 
n 
p t - Vt.i u o > t •- 1>---> T - 1 
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- P t • b tp tMt*l t = 1 - 1 
- P t = -i 
all t and all j. 
Rewriting the second and third set of constraints and combining 
them yields 
meaning of the pfc as evaluators of the budget constraints. If budgets 
are critical, then, from the complementary slackness conditions, we 
know that these optimal p^ values may be nonzero. However, these values 
will differ (in general) from period to period, depending on the ability 
of the firm to use an additional dollar on the remaining investments 
in each period. 
4.4 Mixed-Integer Programming Formulation 
By adding the assumption that the investment opportunities are 
indivisible in nature, i.e. by restricting the x^ to take only the 
values 0 or 1, we arrive at the following statement of the problem: 
JL ^ p /p _ = b_ t Kt' Kt+1 t 
Similar to the case of the Basic M Qdel, one may recognize the 
T - w. T (4.1) 
(P) subject to 
bt-l wt-l all t (4.2) 
v t,w t,y t 0 all t 
x. 
J 
0 or 1, all j 
v ,w o o 0 
This is a mixed 0-1 integer programming problem, i.e. in Balas's 
qualification of special cases it may be assigned to group (a) with 
= 0. The solution to the problem results in the selection of the 
optimal set of indivisible investments, i.e. those that miaximize the 
present value of the firm, and the optimal lending and borrowing 
amounts for all periods up to the horizon time. The variables y are 
the primal slack variables which, under certain assumptions, will be 
shown to vanish in an optimal solution. 
According to Balas's duality concept, the dual to (P) can be 





(D) subject to 
t=l 
j z 1 > • > n (4.4) 
62 
- P t * b t t + 1 * 0 , t . 1,.,T - 1 (4.6) 
P T = 1 (4.7) 
-P T = -1 (4.8) 
p t = 0, all t 
unrestricted, x. = 0 or 1, all i J J 
(P) and (D) read in Balas's notation 
and 
1 1 2 2 max c x * c x 
(P) subject to 
A21 1 A22 2 < 7 A x + A x = b 
Xj s 0 or 1, jeN^ 
= 0, jeN - N x 
2, 2 1 1 max min u b - v x 
1 2 x u 
subject to 
2 A21 1 1 u A - v = c 
2 A22 2 2 u A - v z c 
x.. : 0 or 1, j«N^ 
Vj unrestricted, jeN^ 
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U l > V j = 0, ieM - m 1, jeN - ^ . 
4.5 Analysis of Primal and Dual Problems 
Using the results of Chapter II, we can immediately state the 
following properties: 
According to Theorem I (Involution) the dual of the dual is the 
primal. As in the case of the Basic Model, the vector of primal slack 
variables, (y^,...,y ), is componentwise separable with respect to the 
vector of primal discrete variables, (x^,...,x n), and therefore Theorem 
II holds: 
If (P) has an optimal solution (x^,...,x n;v^,...,v T;w^,...,w T), 
there exists a set of dual prices (,...,p^) such that (p^,,,,,p^; 
x^,...,xn) is an optimal solution to (D), with 
max I , a j x j * ̂ T - "T = m a x m i n I A P t _ I V j ' 
1=1 Xj p t tsl j J J 
i.e., the maximum terminal wealth is equal to the optimal value of the 
resources (budgets) minus the losses (or profits)^" associated with the 
accepted projects. 
In addition to that, the function 
Z n c-» T 
. - - - . , V j * V T " "T + I n V t + 
j=l J t=l 
has a saddle-point at (x^, ... > x n» v^> • • • >v^>w^> • • • >W^J P-̂> • • • > P^) of the 
^"losses and profits in the sense introduced in Section 2.2.D 
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form 
F(x ,v t,w t;p t) = F(x,,v t,w t;p t) = F(xj.v^w.I P t) » 
or, explicitly, 
v- n 
" ^ , V j * " *T J=l 
- ) p M. - ) M-.x. 
r t = i fc ' j-i J J 
v T \- n 
- 2 . t=l 
w t ( - p t + b t P t + 1 ) " (P T " • (p T " l)w T, 
for all (Xj, v t> w t)eX(y t), and all p teU(v t). Here X(yfc) is the set of 
all primal variables satisfying the primal constraint set, when the 
U(v t) is the set of all dual variables p f c satisfying the dual con­
straints (4.5), (4.6), (4.7), and (4.8), when the dual surplus vector 
(that corresponds to continuous primal variables) is fixed at its 
optimal value (v^,...,v^). 
The above two inequalities may be read: the maximum terminal 
wealth of the firm is not less than the terminal wealth using any 
investment policy, plus the value of the excess capacities, evaluated 
at the optimal dual prices; and not more than the value of the resources 
using any feasible dual prices, minus the losses that occur if the 
optimal investment and 1ending-borrowing policies are combined with such 
nonoptimal dual prices. Again, as for the Basic Model, a game-theoretical 
primal slack vector is fixed at its optimal value (y 1,...,y T), and 
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interpretation may be given, wi w being the value 
of the game. 
According to Balas's Theorem 4, the following complementary 
slackness conditions hold 
P ty t = o, t = l » .,T (4.9) 
t = 1,...,T - 1 (4.10) 
( " P t * V t . l ) w t 0, t = 1,.. » T - 1 (4.11) 
- 0 (4.12) 
Equations (4.9), (4.10), (4.11) will be discussed in more detail 
in later parts of this chapter. The complementary slackness condition 
(4.12) can be understood as follows: the net cash outflow (lending minus 
borrowing) at the horizon time is, in the case of optimality, equal to 
the value of the resources plus the cash flows associated with indivisible 
projects only. 
Using Theorem 5, we can finally state that the existence of a 
unique nondegenerate optimal solution to (P) implies the existence of 
a unique optimal solution to (D). ' 
In the following part of this chapter, some further properties 
of the model will be derived and stated in form of three lemmas; based 
on these, an acceptance criterion for the suggested projects will be 
developed. Lopez (17) obtained some results that will be used in this 
context. 
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Lemma 2. Under all explicit and implicit assumptions made (we will 
use here, in particular, the fact that ^ t»b t > 0), the following 
relations hold 
(a) p > 0, all t 
(b) p t = 1 
(c) b - ^ , t = 1,...,T - 1, for a feasible solution 
(d) y t = 0, all t. 
Proof. 
(b) Combining the constraints (4.7), (4.8) we obtain 
1 = p T = 1 , and thus p T = 1 . 
(a) Using the constraint set (4.5) 
T-l 
p t = V t t l w e f i n d t h a t p t ~ ( 1 1 X r ) p T 
r = t 
and, with the result (b), 
T-l 
p_ = II 1 ; since X > 0, all t, p t > 0, all t. rt r* t ' Kt ' r-t 
(c) Considering the constraint sets (4.5) and (4.6) 
V t . l ~ Pt S V t . l ' e " 1 > - " > T " 
^ t - b t, t z 1,...,T - 1 necessarily follows for all 
feasible solutions. 
If, on the other hand, ^ t > b t, for some t, then the constraint 
set is violated, the dual has no feasible solution, and the primal is 
either not feasible or unbounded. In economic terms, the solution will 
then be to borrow money at b t > in period t, and lend it away at with­
out limits. The model fails to find this result at the horizon time T. 
(d) Using result (a), the complementary slackness condition 
p t v t = 0> all t, implies = 0, all t. Q.e.d. (4.9) 
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In other words, the primal cash balance restrictions can be considered 
as equality constraints. In the optimal case, the policy will always 
be to use all the available funds. 
Lemma _3. If ^ t < bfc, then w f cv t = 0, for t = 1, . ..,T - 1. 
Proof. 
The proof will be given for the two possible cases: 
(a) vfc > 0. This implies, by means of relation (4.10), that 
Q_ - i o - ; then p_ i b^p_ - , and, by means of relation (4.11), z 0. t̂ trt+l t trt*l t 
Here, the firm is lending money, from period t to t + 1. 
(b) w > 0. This implies, by means of relation (4.11), that 
p f c • D t P t + ^ ; then pfc ± ^ t P t + p a n^> by means of relation (4.10), vfc = 0. 
Here, the firm is borrowing money, from t to t + 1. In both cases, 
Wt' Vt = ®' Q«e'd« 
According to the results above, it will never be optimal to 
borrow and lend money in the same period, if 1 < b^. The optimal policy 
will be either only to lend or only to borrow money in period t. If 
X = b,., we have indifference for changes of v and w t to v + 6, t t' ° t t t ' 
w
t + 6. This is true because pfc = l tP t 4^ = btPt«,i» by (4.11) and (4.10) 
i.e. these two constraints can be summarized on one equality constraint, 
and it is possible to change the primal variable (vt - w f c), that 
corresponds to this one constraint, by an unrestricted variable. The 
analogous argument holds for v̂ , - w^, regardless of the respective 
values for ^ t and b^. 
Before we state the next lemma, let us consider problem (P), if we 
select a certain vector (x.) = (x.)« We the obtain a linear programming 
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problem of the form: 
max Z n 
(LPR) subject to 
•r~- n 
- X t - i v t - i + v t 4 Bt-i wt-i • w t + y t * M t + h /tj^j 
j=i 
v t , w t , y t ~ 0 
with the dual 
T 
\ 
min ) P,.(M. + / a. .x. 1-1^ t ^j=l t j J 
(LDU) subject to 
P X = 1 
P t = \ p t + 1 , t = 1,..., T - 1 
P t - V t . i t = T • 1 
p t = 0 , all t. 
Lemma 4. The optimal solution to (D) has the property that either 
p t = Vt*i> fc = 1---' T - 1 
or 
Pt = V t . l ' t . l , . . . , T - l 
or both. 
Proof. 
If we combine equations (4.3) and (4.4), i.e. incorporate the 
first set of constraints into the objective function, we obtain the dual 
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problem (D) in the form 
\' n V T n 
max min / a x t ) p (M + ) a x ) (4.13) 
x. P.. j=l J J t=l C j=l C J J J t 
(Dl) subject to 
P t = V t + lJ t - 1, ...,T - 1 (4.14) 
P t = V t > l , t = 1,...,T - 1 (4.15) 
P T = 1 
x. : 0 or 1, all j J J 
P t = 0, all t. 
If we now select a vector (x^), then we get the linear programming 
problem 
r^T y> n MIN4 Pt ( Mt + L . 1 atj 5j> 
P t tzl J=l J J 
(D2) subject to 
P t = i 
Pt - V t . r c : 1 T-1 
p t s btPt+i' 1 - 1 T " 1 
p t - o, 
which is identical with (LDU). In (D2), the constraint set is formed 
by (2T - 2) inequalities; therefore, we can have at most (2T - 2) 
variables, including slacks, at a nonzero level. 
From Lemma 2, we know that p 2 > 0 , t z 1,...,T - 1, so that 
(T - 1) other variables are left that can be greater than zero. We now 
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distinguish between the following two cases: 
(a) bfc i i^. Then at least one of the slack variables of (4.14), (4.15), must be greater than zero. For (T - 1) constraints, this yields (T - 1) 
nonzero slacks, which completes already the maximum number of (2T - 2) 
nonzero variables. Consequently, it is impossible for both slack 
variables of (4.14) and (4.15) to be greater than zero, i.e. 
(b) & z b t < Then the corresponding pair of constraints (4.14), (4.15) 
degenerates to one single constraint 
We know that, if b t = X^, there exists always a solution to 
(D2), whichever vector (x..) was selected, since changes of the price 
vector in the objective function do not affect feasibility. 
From Lemma 4, we know that, at least, either the constraint 
corresponding to the borrowing variable w^ or the one corresponding 
to the lending variable v has to be an equality (for t Z 1,...,T - 1). 
(P - X p J(-p - b p ,) - 0. v p t t Ht+l / v Ht t Ft+r " 
P - X p Ht " t p pt+l or (p t - l t P t 4 l ) = 0. Q.e.d. 
P t = b tp 
Let us therefore define p . such that 5 = X p or 
rt t trt+l 
•^t*!' a n (^ Pt = ^ f ^ben it is possible to write problem (Dl) , 




£l.x. + min J J 




f ^ v n V T - \ ' N i x - / a.x. + m i n ) p..(M_ + / 3 . . . X . ) 
^ j=l J J p t t=l 1=1 J 
Problem (D3) can be handled in an iterative procedure, as we 
will discuss in a later part of this chapter. The next step will be to 
develope, for the special case of a perfect market, i.e. when A^ = bfc, 
all t, an acceptance criterion that allows an evaluation of the suggested 
projects without solving the programming problem. Let us denote the 
common interest rate for period t with i (with i • 1 : r, s 1 ; b,_) . 
r t t t t t 
Then the inequalities (4.14), (4.15) become the equalities 
pt = VT.I 
T-1 
Pt : PT i?t ri • 
which becomes, 
T-1 
pt = r. . (4.17) lzt l % ' 
max 
x 
Using (4.17), problem (D3) can be written as 
C v~. v-> T T-1 *r-> n 
i x - / n a.x. + / . U, r^m,. + ) a .x.) , 
J 
or, after rearranging the terms, 
T T-1 ~ n r- T T-1 
(D4) max"[ x_ -
x. 
J 
r - < 1 l - l - — • I I ~ 1 l - i 
o -1 <i?i ri> Mt f I x j ( a j + L atj< n r i » -
t=l " 1 1=1 J J t*l J i=t 1 
Note that the expression in the second parenthesis, after x., 
T T-1 J 
A. = a. -f / a .( Hr.) 
72 
is the present value at t = T of all cash flows associated with project 
j. The first term in (D4), 
^ T T-l 
I < 1 1 r i ) M t t=l i=t 1 
is a constant, independent of x.., so that the optimal value of x.. (the 
constraints have been incorporated in the objective function) will 
depend only on the sign of Â .. 
Consequently, the criterion for accepting or rejecting investment 
projects can be formulated as: 
v rp T-l f- 0, then x. = 1 , accept 
if A. s a . f ̂  a ( O r . ) J 
2 2 t«l 2 i=t 1 (< 0, then x.. = 0, reject 
project j. 
This result is equivalent to the familiar rule of accepting or 
rejecting a project in accordance with its present value at the horizon 
("future value") being = 0 or < 0, respectively. 
4.6 Decentralized Decision Making 
In Chapter II we discussed the use of linear programming dual 
variables for decentralizing the decisions in a multi-division corpora­
tion. The central authority need only to compute a set of dual prices 
which satisfies certain conditions and order division managers to 
maximize their profits. The result would then be a partially self-
policing system for the achievement of an optimal allocation of resources. 
One would achieve the economic benefits of central direction (in the form 
of central dicisions about the prices of products and the accounting prices 
for scarce resources) without the costly administrative burden and 
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unpleasant bureaucratic interference that goes with detailed central 
supervision. 
As pointed out, such an approach encounters serious problems 
in the case of mixed-integer or pure integer programs. We will show, 
however, that for the Terminal Wealth Model, a decentralized decision 
making process can be developed that avoids the involvement of the 
central authority in the evaluation of divisional investment decision 
problems. 
Before conducting the mathematical analysis, let us first give 
a brief description of the approach to be used. Corporate headquarters 
is faced with the problem of determining the optimal set of indivisible 
investiments and the optimal financing policy (lending to and/or 
borrowing from the capital market) for a multi-division corporation. 
Every single division (department) has at its disposal the cash flow 
patterns associated with all investment opportunities (the cash flows 
from year one up to the horizon time and the horizon time value of 
discounted post horizon cash flows). 
Now headquarters passes out a set of dual prices that are consis­
tent with corporate finance policies and that fulfill certain require­
ments. Then every division uses this set of accounting prices in a 
criterion to evaluate its projects, and determine which projects are 
acceptable and which have to be rejected. 
The cash flow pattern only for acceptable projects are presented 
to headquarters, where this information is pooled and a corporate decision 
problem is constructed; the solution to this problem yields an "over-all" 
set of acceptable investment projects. On the basis of these projects, 
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a new set of dual prices can be determined, which are then passed out 
again to the single divisions to evaluate their opportunities, etc. 
The procedure continues until, after a finite number of steps, a set 
of investment projects maximizing the corporation's profits and a 
set of internally generated optimal dual prices are obtained. Finally, 
these results are used to determine the optimal financing policy of 
the firm, by solving a linear programming problem. 
The method described above is based on Benders' Partitioning 
Procedure (14) for mixed-integer programs and can be broken up into 
a five-step scheme, where step 0 is the initiation of the process. 
STEP 0. 
Headquarters starts with an initial set of dual prices p^, 
t = 1,...,T, which satisfy the constraint set of (D), i.e. which belongs 
to the convex set formed by 
p - X p , ^ 0 Ht tHt-fl 
(DCS) -p t - b t p t + 1 S O 
P T - 1 
P t = 0 . 
This dual vector does n t have to be a vertex of (DCS), it can be 
any feasible vector. The p^ are passed out to the single departments, 
Step 1. 
STEP 1. 
Every single department evaluates its projects, based on the 
following criterion: they determine all those projects j for which 
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(CRIT) a t Y P~a = 0 , 4=1,2,..., 
J t=l J 
where the superscript 4 indicates the 4-th iteration. The cash flow 
information (a\,at..) only about the acceptable projects, which satisfy 
(CRIT), is presented to headquarters, where it is incorporated in a 
corporate decision problem, Step 2. 
STEP 2. 





r - > n \~ T , *r • n 
(CORP) x = ) a\x. + ) p(H + ) a^.x.) 
° j=l J J t»l j=l J J 
Z n P T „ r - > n 
j=l J J t=l j=l J J 
X 
o 
= Y £.x. f Y pf(M_ * Y a„.x.) 
> 1 J J t.l fc fc >j.l t J J 
(CORP) is, in general, a mixed-integer program of a very special 
form--it contains only 0-1 variables x. and one continuous variable x 
J o 
The first iteration in the procedure requires the solution of (CORP) 




J r-. n r-' T •, r» n 
x 
o j:l J J tzl j=l J J 
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which is a pure integer programming problem. Since only the projects 
with positive coefficients for x. have been included the solution here 
J 
is trivial. In general, Step 2 yields an over-all set of acceptable 
X 1 
investment projects, x^, using the p t as dual evaluators, Step 3. 
STEP 3. 
X 
Using the set of projects x., that a re acceptable to the corpora-
X 
tion on the basis of the dual prices p t > headquarters forms and solves 
the following linear programming problem: 
T min 
i -I r-1 n ^ 
t=l jrl J 
(LIDU) subject to 
- K t.i - 0 ' e - 1 - - - T - 1 
-Pt - b t t +i - ° - 1 - - 1 
P t = i 
i 
P t so. 
(LIDU) is obtained from (D), the max-min type dual of (P) , by 
using the fixed decision vector x"̂ . Let the solution to (LIDU) be 
X+1 
P t . This set of dual prices is passed out to the single divisions, 
where new evaluations of the available investment opportunities are 
made, using criterion (CRIT) from Step 1. The cash flows associated 
X+1 
with all acceptable projects x^ are presented to headquarters. Head­
quarters conducts the following test: it determines whether or not 
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(TEST) x - I" « x S V T p^l(M . J " a x ) 
j=l J J tsl J=l J J 
holds. If the equality in (TEST) is satisfied, Step 4. If it is not 
satisfied, go to Step 2 and add 
x = o / a .x. + / p. (M. + / a_ .x.) 
to the existing set of (CORP). Then headquarters olves this new problem 
and goes back to Step 3. An inequality in the constraint set of (CORP) 
can be dropped if the corresponding slack becomes positive. 
STEP 4. 
Now, use is made of the optimal "over-all" set of investments, x^, 
to formulate and solve the linear program 
max v T - w T 
(FIN subject to 
" ?t-lVt-l + Vt + bt-l Wt-l " W t " 
n 
M t *2, atj*j' t = 1,...,T 
v t > w t = 0, all t. 
Let the solution to (FIN) be ( v t»w t), all t. This solution 
then provides the optimal financing policy for the company,, 
Claim : A project will be accepted only if 
j • L * t j p t = °> 
t=l J 
at least for one 4. 
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Proof. 
Let us assume the contrary, i.e. that there is an optimal solution 
with one or more projects k such that 
v1 T i 
a k + 2, l a t k p t < °' f o r a 1 1 1 ' 
Then these projects cause nonpositive contributions 
of various size in all of the X constraints of (CORP); therefore, to set 
the corresponding x^ equal to zero, would cause a monotonous increase 
of the values of all right-hand sides in (CORP), including those active 
constraints that currently determine the value of x . It follows that 
J o 
the considered solution could not be optimal, as assumed in the hypothesis. 
Q.e.d. 
We see that this 5-step procedure provdies a method of determining 
a firm's investment and financing policy, with a considerable part of the 
decision process being delegated from headquarters to the single departments 
of the organization. At the same time, a set of internally generated 
discount rates is provided, thus solving the problem of determining the 
cost of capital. 
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CHAPTER V 
BAUMOL AND QUANDT'S UTILITY MODEL 
5.1 Introduction 
The main difficulty in the application of the Basic Model is the 
determination of the present value of project j; in particular, which 
discounting factors should be used for computing b^? Similar questions 
arise for the Terminal Wealth Model when the a. have to be determined. 
J 
Lorie and Savage (14) and Weingartner (15) all mentioned the difficulties 
but nothing to resolve them; they assumed that the appropriate discount 
rates were available. Baumol and Quandt (5) attempted unsuccessfully 
to establish appropriate discounting factors internally by utilizing 
the dual model. They pointed out that in models, where the firm operates 
without resources to a capital market, it is cut off from any external 
discount criteria and thus external rates of interest are irrelevant. 
Baumol and Quandt showed that it is impossible to use simul­
taneously a present value formulation of the objective function and to 
have the relevant discount rates generated by the model. Their approach 
was to turn to a formulation using an investor's utility function. As 
in the preceding chapters, we will introduce their model first in its 
original form as a linear programming problem and then analyze the 
effects of introducing indivisibilities, making use of Balas's duality 
and its economic implications. 
5.2 The Linear Utility Model 
The problem under consideration is to find optimal investment 
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and dividend policies for a firm without resource to a capital market. 
The firm considers n different, clearly defined investment projects, its 
capital expenditures are limited. The investor is taken to wish ulti­
mately to maximize--as Baumol and Quandt put it--his ability to consume, 
i.e. the sum of withdrawals of cash made available by the projects 
undertaken, each withdrawal weighted by its subjective utility. 
Letting 
W t be the cash dividend to be paid to the owner at time t; 
U be the fixed utility of a dollar in period t; 
afcj be the net cash flow obtained from a unit of project j 
during period t; 
Mfc be the amount of cash available from projects outside 
the analysis and from other sources at time t; 
Xj be the number of units of project j invested; 
and assuming a planning horizon of T years, the mathematical statement 
of the problem is: 
max ) UJtf 
L
 t.i t t 
(LP) subject to 
jrl 
K j ) W t ^ 0. 
Baumol and Quandt assumed that utility is nonnegative and linear 
in money, although they pointed out the possibility of a nonlinear 
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objective function. The structural constraints in (LP) were shown (5) 
to hold as strict equalities, since every additional dollar would be 
paid out as a dividend at a positive utility. As opposed to Weingartner's 
Basic Model, (LP) does consider the owner's time preferences for con­
sumption. 
between the firm and the single owner-entrepreneur, and the fact that it 
requires an assignment of the utility measure in advance of information 
about the withdrawal possibilities. Another problem arises through the 
fact that the model does not consider post horizon cash flows from 
projects accepted. This may change the overall desirability of these 
projects and it also makes the solution sensitive to the choice of the 
horizon. It, in fact, means in this model, where investments have 
constant returns to scale without limit, that the maximum number of 
projects selected is T, the number of periods to the horizon. 
Some of the drawbacks of the model are that it assumes an identity 
1 
5.3 The Dual Problem 
The linear programming problem (LP) has a dual of the form 
T 
t=l 
(LD) subject to 
t=l 
j r 1 , . . • , n 
or it assumes that all stockholders have the same time preferences. 
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P t= U t, t = 1, ...,T 
To interpret the dual variables p f c, consider an optimal solution 
and assume that W and W are positive dividend payments in the periods 
tl 2 
t̂  and t 2 in this optimal solution. Then the corresponding dual con­
straints must be strict equalities: 
so that 
Baumol and Quandt interpret the last equation as follows: the 
marginal rate of substitution between withdrawals in the two periods 
equals the discount rate at the optimum if funds are withdrawn during 
both period t.. and period t«. U /U is to be understood as a relative, h 2 
subjective discount rate, whereas the "objective rate" p /p is based 
tl 2 
on the actual production opportunities available. 
Suppose, at optimality no money is withdrawn in period t̂ , then 
this may be interpreted as the reasonable statement that p , the 
t3 
marginal objective utility of $1 at time t must be at least equal to 
the subjective utility U . 
3 
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After this brief introduction, we consider Baumol and Quandt's 
model under the additional assumption that the projects are indivisible 
in nature, and that multiple projects are excluded. 
5.4 The Mixed-Integer Programming Formulation 
Adding the assumption of indivisible projects by means of a 0-1 
restriction on the x.., we obtain the following model 
max Y U.W. (5.1) 
t=l t t 
subject to 
- 7 a. .x. + W - M , all t (5.2) 
u j_ x tJ J t t ' 
x. : 0 or 1, all i 
W t = 0, all t. 
(P) represents a mixed-integer programming problem, corresponding 
to case (a) in Balas's qualification, since the set of dual integer 
variables is empty. The model produces the optimal set of indivisible 
projects and the optimal combination of dividend payments up to the 
horizon time. As in the case of the linear programming formulation, the 
constraints of (P) must always be equalities in an optimal solution, since 
the subjective utilities U t are assumed to be strictly positive for all t. 




max min i n I t = 1 p t M t - l ^ V J ( 5 - 3 ) 
(D) subject to 
-) • a^.p,. - = 0 all j (5.4) 
P t - * t = u t > a 1 1 t (5.5) 
p t, X t = 0 , all t 




The dual problem (D) is a constrained mixed-integer optimization 
problem of the type max-min. The nonegative dual surplus variables, \ , 
correspond to the continuous primal variables, W t > whereas the unrestricted 
dual surplus variables, l-k, correspond to the 0-1 constrained primal 
variables, x^. As in the case of any mixed-integer programming problem 
12 
and its dual, the coefficient submatrix A = 0 (in Balas's notation), 
and the constraint qualification is met. 
5.5 Duality Relations and the Analysis 
of Primal and Dual at Optimality 
As in the former chapters, we are able to state and derive 
several properties of (P) and (D) which deviate distinctly from the case 
of the linear formulations (LP) and (LD) . The first property we state, 
however, will trivially hold for both cases. 
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If Mfc is nonnegative for t r 1,...,T, then (p) has always 
feasible solutions. Obviously, here x^ = 0, all j, and Wfc = 0, all t, 
will always be feasible to ( p ) . 
Applying Balas's Theorem 1, we find that primal and dual are 
involutory. 
Theorem 2, which holds in accordance with the fulfilled con­
straint qualification, here reads as follows: If (p) has an optimal 
(p^,...,P t), such that (p^, ..., p,j,; x^,...,xn) is an optimal solution to 
(D) with 
i.e., the maximum sum of cash dividends, each dividend weighted by its 
subjective utility, is equal to the value of the outside resources, 
evaluated at the dual variables p t > minus the value of the cash flows 
using the same evaluators. 
solution (x. x ; W.,...,W m), there exists a set of dual variables n 1 ' T 
(5.6) 
Furthermore, the function 
has a saddle-point at (x. > .,xn; W,...,WT , • • • , 
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7 T T v~T 
I u t w t *l P ty t * £ U t*t " 
t=l t-l t=l 
(5.7) 
L PtM - £ M , 
t=l j=l J J 
for all (x.,W )eX(y ), and all p eU(\ ) . Here, X(y ) is the set of 
all primal variables satisfying the primal constraint set, when the 
primal slack vector is fixed at its optimal level (y^), and U(\ t) is 
the set of all dual variables pfc satisfying the dual constraints (5.5), 
when the dual surplus vector (that corresponds to the continuous primal 
variables) is fixed at its optimal level (^t). 
The next result, obtained from Theorem 4, is: If (x-,...,x : 
I n 
W^,...,WT) and (p^,...,p T; x^,...,xn) are optimal solutions to (P) 
and (D) respectively, then the following complementary slackness con­
ditions hold: 
P t-y t = 0 , t r 1,...,T (5.8) 
W t - X t = 0 , t = 1,...,T (5.9) 
iTn ut*t - r / t < M t • r a t j x j > = ° • < 5- i o> 
t = l t a t l J s l J 
From the dual constraints (5.5) we knpw that pfc - u*t > 0, for 
all t, what, together with (5.8), implies y • 0, for all t, as stated 
before. Condition (5.9) is equivalent to the statement that, at optimality, 
dividends are paid out only in those periods where the associated sub­
jective utilities u*t are equal to the corresponding dual variables p f c. 
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Condition (5.10) turns out to be identical to the symmetry relationship 
(5.6), if we substitute for the u. from the constraints (5.4). 
Finally, the existence of a unique nondegenerate optimal solu­
tion to (P) implies the existence of a unique optimal solution to (D), 
according to Theorem 5. 
5.6 The Equivalent Linear Program 
and its Economic Interpretation 
So far, we did not use the concepts of marginality in the inter­
pretation of the dual variables pt» although we know that their dimension 
must be that of utilities. The mixed-integer program (P) can be solved, 
applying, for instance, Benders' Partitioning Procedure, and yields an 
optimal solution (x^,...,x ; W^,...,^ ) . This solution, or more pre­
cisely, its binary components x^, can be used to solve (D), which 
becomes a linear program. Then, by means of Theorem 6, the following 
linear program (ELP) can be constructed: 
-. T 
max) s .x . t / UJT 
(ELP) subject to 
- i . V t J x i + w t - Mt= all t 
x. s 1 , all j 
J 
Xj,Wfc ^ 0 , all j, all t, 
where quantities s^ are given by 
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with 
a. = p.. , if x. > 0 , J J J 
s. • minCO.M-.), if x. * 0, J J J 
at.-Pt. (unrestricted) 
J t-1 
The dual of (ELP) has the form 
— T v- n 
min / pji t ) w. 
H a ' ' ^ j . i J 
(ELD) subject to 
<-<T 
" ^ = 1 H T J P T + ^ 
all j 
p t £ U t, all t 
Pt.w^ = 0 , all t, all j 
Let us analyze this pair of linear programs in more detail. 
Whereas in the case of Weingartner's Basic Model, the quantities s^ 
played the role of subsidies or penalties for certain projects, which 
were originally characterized by their unit profits c^, the objective 
function in Baumol and Quandt's model does not contain such profits 
Cj at all. Therefore, the results of the linearization of (P) in the 
above manner are not only the introduction of the variables w^, caused 
by the upper bound constraints on the x^, but also a conceptually 
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different objective function. The objective function in (ELP) con-
tains, besides the term in the utilities of the dividend payments, 
a term involving "profits" and "losses"--in a cost accounting sense-
associated with each project j. 
Similar to the case of the Basic Model, the quantites w^ will 
be seen to play the role of project evaluators; at optimality, they 
are natural by-products of the linear programming solution for ranking 
all projects considered. Their value is an indicator for the desira­
bility of a project or the economic goodwill associated with the return 
from that project. 
Now operating in a linear programming framework, we are able to 
use the concepts of shadow prices as evaluators of the budget resources. 
Due to the results of Chapter II, the properties of (ELP) and (ELD), 
as far as they are relevant for an economic interpretation of the model, 
are: 
If (P) has an optimal solution (x^,...,x ; W^,...,W T), there 
exists a vector of utilities pfc = 0, all t, and quantities s^, that are 
unrestricted in sign, such that 
(a) an optimal solution to (P) is also optimal to (ELP); 
( b ) " ^ t ! i * * A * * J ~ a y i - e ' 
the sum of discounted outlays, as evaluated at p f c, the marginal objective 
utility of each budget year, plus the optimal value of the corresponding 
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project evaluators, w,., is never less than the imputed profit s,., 
associated with project j; 
(c) p t = U t, i.e. 
the marginal objective utility of $1 at time t must be at least equal 
to the subjective utility U t > procurable from its possible qse as a 
dividend payment at that time; 
<d> I " ( -P/tjPt + -j "fa -o. 
JSL TSL J J J 
what implies, considering the nonegativity of all terms in the sum, 
(-XT/TJPT **i - *fa -0> 4-e-
a project will be accepted only if the corresponding constraints in 
(ELD) hold as an equality. Then, the "value" of an accepted project, 
Wy will be the excess, if any, of its recomputed profit s^ over the 
sum of outlays as evaluated at p t; 
(e) pt(Mt . 1°",̂  " V = 0. or, 
by the same argument as in (d), 
Y N 
p (M + ) a x. - W ) = 0, and, since all objective t t _^ t j j t 
utilities p t are strictly positive (p t - U t > 0), 
M_ * ) n a_.x. - W. - 0, i.e. 
j=l J J 
at optimality, all budgets are exhausted, since every additional dollar 
would be paid out as dividend at a positive utility; 
V n _ 
(f) ) w.(l - x-) = 0, or, for each single project, 
j-1 J 
w.(l - x.) = 0, i.e. 
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project j has to be accepted if the value of its indicator 
is positive, in the optimal solution; it may or may not be acceptable 
if this value is zero; 
Z n V T V n 
j-i 2 J t=i t=i j =i 2 
i.e. the imputed profit from all accepted projects plus the sum of all 
dividends, weighted with their subjective utilities, must be, for the 
optimal case, equal to the sum of all budgets, evaluated at the corres­




SYNTHESIS OF A NEW MODEL 
6.1 Introduction 
There seems to be a rather widespread agreement in the literature 
on the mathematics of finance that an appropriate objective in the planning 
of a firm's productive investment and financing policy is the maximization 
of some function, usually a discounted sum, of all anticipated dividend 
payments to the owners of the firm's present shares. If, in the function's 
argument, the stream of dividends is truncated at some finite horizon time, 
T, as required in a programming formulation, then it seems reasonable to 
include also in the argument the time T terminal wealth as an indicator 
for the post T stream of dividends. 
The models we discussed in the Chapters III and IV set the total 
profit and the terminal wealth, respectively, as the objective to be 
maximized, and simply did not allow dividend payments prior to or at 
the horizon time. The Baumol-Quandt Model, on the other hand, was using 
a utility formulation involving dividend payments in period 1,...,T, but 
showed a certain lack of realism because of the extremely simple structure 
of its constraints. 
In this chapter, we construct a model that represents a synthesis 
of both approaches discussed before, by maximizing a function of a finite 
stream, W^,...,WT, of dividend payments and of the terminal wealth of the 
firm under consideration. A further market imperfection, in addition to 
the difference between borrowing and lending rates, is introduced in form 
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of upper bounds on the amounts borrowed. The solution to this model 
yields the optimal investment, dividend, and financing policy of the firm 
under consideration. Rather than assuming constant returns-to-scale for 
the available investment projects, we assume that the projects are 
indivisible in nature. 
A firm considers n different, clearly defined investment projects. 
The firm is able to interact with the capital market where it can lend 
and borrow money at predetermined discount rates. The capital expendi­
tures as well as the amount of money borrowed in a certain period are 
limited. The firm's objective is to maximize the discounted stream of 
dividend payments plus the terminal wealth of the company as of a finite 
time horizon T. 
Let 
a . be the net cash flow from the j-th project in period t; 
ai. be the horizon time T present value of post T cash flows 
6.2 Statement of the Problem 
J 
from project j; 
be the amount of cash made available from projects outside the 
analysis and from other outside sources at time t; 
be equal to 1 + r^ , where r^ is the lending rate of interest t 
from time t to t + 1; 
be equal to 1 _ r^t, where r^ t is the borrowing rate of 
interest from time t to t + 1; it is assumed that b̂ . = 1 • 
t t 
be the maximum value of w , where w is a variable defined below, 
at time t; 
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x.. be a binary variable with the value 1 if the j-th project is 
adopted and 0 otherwise; 
Wfc be the dividend to be paid at time t; 
P t be the rate at which such dividends are valued by the stock­
holders; p̂ , is assumed to be equal to 1; 
wfc be the cash to be borrowed from time t to t + 1; 
v t be the cash to be lent from time t to t + 1; v = w = 0 , t * o o 
by definition. 
Choosing the horizon time T as the reference point for all 
considerations concerning the "time value of money," the mathematical 
statement of the problem is: 
r-i n r-i T 
max p ( ) a x + v - w ) + ) p.W. (6.1) i ^ j = 1 J J i i - J t = 1 t t 
(P) subject to 
- V a_.x. - I v , + v + b _w . + w + W_ = M , 
t-i. , tj j t-1 t-1 t t-1 t-1 t t t J=l 
for t = 1,...,T (6.2) 
w t = B t, for t = 1,...,T - 1 (6.3) 
Xj = 0 or 1, for j • l,...,n 
v t,w t,W t ^ 0, all t. 
The bojective function (6.1) contains basically three components, 
(a) the net amount of all financial assets accumulated at the horizon, 
v T - w , (b) the time T present value of post T cash flows, .) a.x., 
j-1 3 3 
and (c) the sum of all dividend payments up to the horizon time, all terms 
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weighted with the respective rates pfc at which such dividends are valued 
by the stockholders. We shall assume in this model that pfc > 0 for all 
t. Consequently, in the objective function the coefficient of W will 
be greater than zero, and therefore any slack would clearly be paid out 
as dividend. 
Using the assumption p = 1 and introducing slack variables into 
(P), the mathematical programming model may be written as 
T 
max 
r—i n r—i 1 
/ a.x. + v m - w m + ) p VJ 
(P) subject to 
• I°*tj xj • V i v t - i + V i V i + w t + " t + y t = V 
J=l 
all t 
w t + q t = B t, for t * 1 T - l 
x. = 0 or 1, all j 
v t,w t,W t i= 0. 
The cash balance restriction (6.2), taking the terms in order, 
say that the net cash outflow to projects, minus the cash inflow from 
time t - l loans, plus the cash outflow for time t loans, plus the cash 
outflow for time t dividends, must be less or equal to the cash available 
from outside sources at time t. The amounts from outside sources, M t» 
will be assumed to be nonnegative for all t up to the horizon time. 
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6.3 Problems Caused by the Finite Horizon 
Before we formulate the dual problem, we want to use this model 
as an example for some of the problems arising when the assumption of a 
finite horizon is made. Consider^ a.x., the time T present value of 
j-1 J J 
post T cash flows. If for periods beginning at T + 1, each period has 
one single market rate, rfc, at which borrowing and lending may take 
place, then future cash flows can without problem be converted to a 
time T present worth 
V 0 0 t -1 a. = > a . n \ L with \ = 1 + r . 
J S-TH-1 t J k=T+l k ~ V t t 
But let us now consider the case where b„ > A and let d be a 
T T 
cash receipt which is to occur at time T + 1. Then the time T value of 
d depends on whether the firm is a borrower or a lender (or either) from 
T to T + 1. If, e.g., the firm is a borrower, then at T, it may borrow 
d.b T * and pay it off at T + 1 with the d. Hence, we should say that d, 
at T + 1, is worth d.b"1 at T. 
If, on the other hand, the firm is a lender from T to T + 1, then 
availability of the d at T + 1 relieves us of lending an amount d.A^} 
at T. In this case, we would say that d at T + 1 has a time T value of 
d.A^ > d.b^. Therefore, just what a post T cash flow is worth at T 
cannot be determined until we know the firm's post T borrowing and lending 
pattern. Hence, we will assume for our model that each post T period has 
a single market rate, rfc, for borrowing and lending. 
Closely connected with the above arguments is the explanation for 
the fact that no upper bound on borrowing was imposed for the time period 
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T. Suppose, for example, B^ = 0. Then w T, the optimal value, has to be 
zero, too. What then is the time T + 1 cash flow, d, worth at T? If it 
(if the firm is a prospective borrower), the d cannot be converted to 
time point T. Again, we see that the time T value of d depends on the 
post T financing picture, which is a product of the analysis, rather than 
being given a priori as some given constant times the d. Hence, if we 
wish to measure a. in advance, we must avoid to have a constraint 
What is the optimal choice for a horizon time T? With the assump­
tion of just a single market rate, r t, for each post T period, T ought 
to be large to make the model more realistic. However, this aspect must 
be weighted against the increased number of constraints and hence probably 
increased difficulty of solution, which a larger value of T would imply, 
as well as the increased difficulty to obtain sufficiently reliable 
estimates (forecasts) for the various cash flows to be explicitly 
considered in the model. 
According to the duality concepts stated in Chapter II the dual 
of (P), a mixed-integer programming problem, is a max-min type optimization 
problem of the from 
saves some lending, it is again worth d.X . But, if it is needed at T 
6.4 The Dual Problem 
max (6.4) 
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(D) subject to 
V T 
" S - i 1 1 ^ " " V a 1 1 j ( 6 - 5 ) 
Pt " Vfcfl - 0 ' t - 1.....T - 1 (6.6) 
" P t + b t p t + l + 3t " 0 • fc - 1> • • • >T - 1 (6.7) 
p
T ~ 1 (6.8) 
" PT ~ ~ l (6.9) 
pt " X t = pt (6.10) 
p t , P t , X t = °' a 1 1 11 
M»j unrestricted, all j. 
Thus, the dual contains the binary primal variables x ̂; the 
continuous dual variables pfc,3fc; the nonnegative dual surplus variables 
X^, and (6.6) and (6.7), all corresponding to the continuous primal varia­
bles, W t,v t, and wfc; and, finally the unrestricted dual surplus variables 
|ij associated with the discrete primal x ̂. 
Table 6.1 shows the relationships between all variables and 
constants occurring in (P) and (D), where both problems are stated in terms 
of the original set of inequalities. 
xl • n vi • • . . • • v T Wl • ' W T W l • ' • • • • W T 
Pi 
• 
- all- • --ain i 
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,x ) ' n 
J » • • • »̂ rji » • • • >̂ rji) 
,P T;3 1,...,3 T) 
,MT;B1,...,BT_1>0) 
,a ) n 
,1; 0,...,-l; p^,..., p,j,) 
(P) and (D) read in Balas's notation 
1 1 2 2 max c x + c x 
subject to 
.21 1 22 2 < 2 A x + A x = b 







0 or 1, jeNx 
0, jeN - N^, and 
(D') subject to 
221 u A 
2 A22 u A 
- v 
- v 





0 or 1, jeN x 
unrestricted, jeN^ 
ieM - MV jeN - K , 
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Since A =0, the constraint qualification is met, so that 
Theorem 2 will apply. 
6.5 Properties of the Model 
and Economic Interpretations 
The capital budgeting model (P) under consideration becomes 
equivalent (not identical) to Weingartner1s Terminal Wealth Model, if 
we assure pfc = 0, all t, and increase B t, all t, without limit; then, by 
complementary slackness, Wfc will always be zero at optimality, and the 
optimal solutions will be equal for both problems. On the other hand, 
we arrive at the Baumol-Quandt Model if we exclude upper bounds on 
borrowing, borrowing and lending transactions themselves, and the 
terminal wealth, as part of the maximizing objective, from our model. 
The theorems in Chapter II can be applied and lead to the 
following results: 
Theorem 1 (Involution) holds in the same form as stated there. 
The vector of primal slack variables (y^, . .. ,y,j,;q̂ ,... ,q̂ ,) is 
componentwise separable with respect to the vector of the discrete 
primal decision variables (x^,...,x ), and therefore Theorem 2 holds: 
If (P) has an optimal solution (x^,... ,xn;v^, ... ,v̂ ,; w^,...,w^,; 
W^,...,W T), there exist sets of dual variables, (p^,...,p T) and 
(5^,...,?T) such that (p^,...,PT;P^,...,BT;x^,...fxn) is an optimal 
solution to (D), and the symmetry relationship 
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V n V T max / a.x. + v m - w_ + / p W 
(6.11) 
^ - i T ^ - i T ^ - i n 
= max min ) p M + / 3.B - / |i x. 
x. P t,P t -t=l fc fc ~' t=l fc 11 " > 1 j J 
holds. We will interpret this equality after the analysis of the single 
variables involved. 
In accordance with Theorem 4, we are able to state the following 
complementary slackness conditions: 
y t-P t = 0 , t - 1,...,T (6.12) 
qt-Pt = 0 , t = 1,..., T - 1 (6.13) 
(Pt " V t + l ^ t = °' t = 1,...,T - 1 (6.14) 
<-pt + b t P t + 1 ) ^ t • °» t = 1,...,T - 1 (6.15) 
\ t-W = 0 , t = 1,...,T (6.16) 
T s-i T rn n 
V T - w x - 1 p"tMt - L A B t + L <p"t + B t ) I. Stfi' °> ( 6 - 1 7 ) 
t=l t=l t=l j=l 
where yfc stands for the excess funds in period t, q t for the unused 
amount available for borrowing, and \ f c = p f c - pfc. 
Using the relationships stated above and the constraint sets of 
(P) and (D), we are now able to derive a number of properties of the 
various problem variables, which will give more insight into the structure 
of the model. 
Lemma 5. In an optimal solution to (P) and (D) the following relationships 
hold: 
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(a) p t > 0, all t 
(b) p T - l 
(c) y t = 0, all t 
Proof. 
(b) follows directly from (6.8) and (6.9); 
(a) here, we can rewrite (6.6) in the form 
p " t = V t + i • 
and, by repeated application of this inequality, we obtain 
T-l T-l 
P t = ( n i ) p- - r 2 t tr > 0; 
r=t 
(c) follows from (a) together with the complementary slackness 
condition (6.12). Q.e.d. 
Lemma 6. Assume that 1 < bfc. Then 
w
t ' v t = 0» f° r all t» 
i.e., the firm will never borrow and lend money in the same period. 
Proof. 
Combining the constraints (6.6) and (6.7), we obtain 
V"t+i - h - V t f i + K • <6-18> 
By complementary slackness (6.13) and (6.14), if vfc > 0, 
£ p^' = p and w^ = 0 holds; i.e. from t to t + 1 the firm is lending t t+1 t t 
money, and the ratio of two successive dual variables, p to p _, is the 
t t"t i 
lending rate, A . Similarily, if the firm is a borrower from t to t + 1, 
i.e. if w_> 0, then * bjj ,- + P., and v » 0 holds, t rt tr t+1 t t 
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In this case, the ratio of to P^^ is equal to the lending 
rate only if w f c < B t, what implies that Pt « 0. 
If, for period t, both w f c and v are equal to zero, then all we 
know is that the general expression (6,18) holds. Q.e.d. 
Let us analyze now the special case = b - r . Then (6.18) 
becomes 
rt p~t*l - ? t - V t f l + p t • ( 6 - 1 9 ) 
Assume that w f c > 0; then p = r t P t + ^ + ^ t> a n d two cases are 
possible: 
(a) if 0 < w f c < B ;P • 0 and v = 0; i.e. if the upper bound 
constraint on the amount borrowed is not active, we are indifferent 
between lending and borrowing in this period; it may be optimal to do 
both; 
(b) if w f c = Bfc, then 3 > 0 implies v - 0, i.e. in a period 
where it is optimal to borrow as much as possible in the capital market, 
it will not be optimal to lend away money at the same time. 
Let us finally ask the question in which period dividends are paid 
to the shareholders. The answer is obtained from the complementary slack­
ness condition (6.13) 
W t(P t - P t) - o. 
This condition implies that dividends are paid in period t only 
if the value of the corresponding dual variable p t is equal to p t > the 
rate at which dividends in period t are valued by the shareholders. If, 
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however, P t > Pt> then maximizing the overall objective asks for 
utilizing available funds for financing projects and/or lending cash 
in period t. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Conclusions 
In the development of this research, a duality concept due to 
Balas for discrete programming was used to handle the mathematical 
aspects of four capital budgeting models, which were stated in the form 
of pure and mixed integer programming problems, in particular, and of 
resource allocation models, in general, that involve discrete and/or 
continuous variables. 
This duality concept was presented for the case of two "dual" 
problems, where the min-max/max-min of a linear function is to be 
found over a domain defined by linear inequalities, and the variables 
are constrained to belong to arbitrary sets of real numbers, i.e. some 
or all of the variables are discrete. 
The question of including indivisibilities in models describing 
economic situations were discussed, and the problems arising from such 
inclusion of discreteness, concerning the interpretation of results, 
uniqueness of optimal solutions, etc. were analyzed. 
For the case of a firm operating in a purely competitive market, 
the linear programming concepts of shadow prices, marginal costs, free 
goods, and decentralization were summarized and then extended to the 
case of discrete programming models, using Balas's duality. It was 
found that the powerful linear programming concepts can be applied 
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also to discrete programs, by transforming them into "equivalent linear 
programs," if certain conditions are met. 
The linearized model, however, does not constitute a means of 
testing optimality for the discrete program, since only a one-way 
relation between the problems could be established. This means that 
the used discrete programming algorithm to solve the original problem 
must provide us already with an optimal solution, before the new, 
linearized problem can be developed, solved, and interpreted. 
Including the assumption of indivisible projects in the capital 
budgeting models due to Weingartner and Buamol and Quandt, and intro­
ducing the concepts mentioned above, new economic interpretations 
involving generalized shadow prices and a system of subsidies and 
penalties could be obtained for the optimal solutions to these models. 
One of Balas's theorems.allowed the interpretation of the profit-
maximizing firm in terms of a two-person zero-sum game. 
More powerful results than in the case of general mixed-integer 
programming problems could be obtained for the pure 0-1 problem. 
For Weingartner1s Terminal Wealth Model, a decentralized decision 
making process could be developed that avoids the complete involvement 
of the central authority in the evaluation of the divisional investment 
decision problems. This finite process is a means of determining the 
firm's investment and financing policy, and, at the same time, internally 
generates the optimal set of discount rates by gradually updating them 
from an arbitrary initial set af feasible values. 
Based on the mixed-integer versions of Weingartner's Terminal 
Wealth Model and Baumol and Quandt's Utility Model, a capital budgeting 
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model was constructed that represents a synthesis of both approaches, 
and the solution of which yields the optimal investment, dividend, and 
financing policy of a firm interacting with a non-perfect capital 
market. Among the issues discussed was the question of assuming finite 
horizon times and including post horizon cash flows, as well as the 
consequences of limiting the amounts of capital avaiable for borrowing 
in each time period considered. Also, the relations between the optimal 
investment, financing, and dividend policies were discussed and some 
decision rules concerning these questions were obtained. 
Recommendations 
Some suggestions for extending this work are: 
1. Include the option to carry over money from one period to 
the next or to a following period. 
2. Use nonlinear objective functions involving both dividend 
payments and some equivalent of a "terminal wealth" of a firm. 
3. Consider other types of (linear or nonlinear) constraints, 
as scarce material restrictions, space restrictions, etc. according 
to the particular situation considered. 
4. Introduce the aspects of risk and uncertainty into the 
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